Judging by the last 2 posts, the US has just approved 6 days of ammunition.
From recent predictions regarding Russia’s decreasing supply of munitions, it feels like they have the capacity for one more sustained (weeks maybe a month or 2) offensive in the East. Then as winter approaches they will fall back to defending their occupied positions in the East and South and Ukraine will be forced to endure higher casualties as they attempt to take back their land.
It will be a very high risk moment if Russia, with nuclear capability, loses Crimea and is defending the East with conventional weapons that don’t match NATO weapons supplied to Ukraine.
You can see a situation where the EU tries to force Ukraine into a compromise that accepts the loss of occupied land in the East regardless of the longer term implications and immorality of rewarding Russia’s aggression.
Some interesting notes from the Ukrainian i follow:
Moldova denied transit for Russian troops to Transnistria this morning. In the afternoon, Ukrainian Head of Intelligence Kyrylo Budanov stated that Ukraine will help Moldova with de-occupation of Transnistria, should the nation ask to do so.
Following its own goals, Israel has hit the Iranian factory that produced drones, including those Russia was asking Iran for.
Ukraine, Turkey, the UN and Russia have signed a series of agreements that would allow to deblock Ukrainian ports for export of grains, ammonia and some other strategic goods.
Per a senior US military official, Russia has now committed around 85% of its active military in Ukraine. Lots of border segments are not covered, all exercises ceased.
Ukrainian Armed Forces have performed a precise hit of Russian military base located on the premises of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, using Switchblade loitering missiles. All nuclear and civilian infrastructure is absolutely safe.
Lastly, the US have announced the provision of 580 Phoenix Ghost strike loitering missiles. These kamikaze drones can be in air for up to 6 hours and bring more explosives than their closest analog, the Switchblade.
UN Secretary General said the grains agreement was a long time in the making, complex, an agreement for the world and the most important he had signed on to.
Turkey gets accolades for statesmanship after being seen as a disrupter .
Russia has emphasised the agreement frees up exports of its own agricultural exports and fertilisers. While they are not subject to sanctions, commercial shippers and insurers have been reluctant to be involved in the trade of Russian product. Guessing that Russia has been given assurances that sanctions will not be imposed in future in this trade, including financial and that there will be no retribution to the private sector. Possibly also a line drawn on the stolen Ukraine grains. Reportedly, Lebanon ( which relies on Ukraine for around 80% of its grains) has rejected some ships bringing grains from the Black Sea.
Grain traded through Syria will continue to be suspect.
ADD
According to Ukraine, a Joint Coordination Centre to be established in Istanbul under UN auspices. Agreement valid for 120 days, can be rolled over. Three Ukraine ports to ship.
The Phoenix drones and training in their use are featured in an article in the War Zone section of
thedrive.com
As to the wider use of unmanned combat aerial vehicles and their range, see comments by US Rear Admiral in an article of 21 July in
navalnews.com
That’s interesting and puzzling.
It is not as bad as it looks - ordinary ammunition gets used up much faster with less effect.
These can destroy important targets more reliably.
For moving targets guided munitions make sense.
I am puzzled about loitering drones though. They cannot reach the target area as fast as rockets or faster than ISR drones with laser designators.
So if a target does not need the speed and cost of a guided rocket I am unclear as to why it cannot be dealt with by an ISR drone providing both ordinary forward observer artillery spotting for normal artillery and laser designation for laser guided rockets if target is moving too erratically and fast.
Some guesses:
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US “National Security” prefers to centralize Ukrainian ISR within its own orbit relying on NGA.
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Arms industry prefers expendable munitions just like Big Pharma prefers treatments that require more of the same rather than fundamental research for cures.
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Air force pilots and engineers get tasked with developing Uninhabited UAVs to replace Piloted Aircraft. That is sort of like tasking a horsebreeder to develop horseless carriages or a Teleco to develop the Internet. They would prefer to have them blow themselves up. Australia wisely put a carriagemaker (Holden) in charge of working with General Motors for a car industry to provide horseless carriages and unwisely chose a Teleco to bypass the telecoms industry.
Some suport for that theory is provided by looking at who was tasked to develop something in support of Ukraine from 2014 war and came up with the latest “Phoenix Ghost” loitering munition - a program called “Safari”:
It looks to me like that Safari is the “Air Force” version of how to handle Air Force Urgent Operational Needs (Air Force UONs).
I think an ISR drone with 6 hours endurance and cheap enough to be expendable would be a very good match for current Ukrainian Urgent and Emerging UONs if instead of carrying a payload designed to blow itself up, it carried the same weight for jam resistance communications and Precise Navigation and Timing and enhanced sensors.
The US program that could help do that is not Safari but JDICS.
I am still working on attempt to clarify before responding to @elfm but a good preliminary is to explain who Ukraine would need to get tasked to evaluate a proposal to field something different quickly. That at least clarifies what sort of proposal I am trying to draft.
Fortunately:
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Ukraine’s people are being mobilized to fight. Some units that helped win the battle for Kyiv did not exist before the invasion and were not yet enlisted.
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The Mission Engineering capabilities needed do not require significant R&D but are mainly systems integration and rapid production of mature technology available Commercially Off The Shelf (COTS). But I need to draft clear documents explaining that.
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The US has a specific team with a process for bypassing the cumbersome US procurement machinery.
JCIDS Urgent/Emergent Process . The urgent and emergent process lane provides Sponsors with the ability to address capability gaps in ongoing or anticipated contingency operations as expeditiously as possible within the two-year timeframe. The Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) or Joint Emergent Operational Need (JEON) provide the required documentation to approve joint military capability requirements for this lane. The staffing timeline for urgent and emergent needs is conducted as expeditiously as possible within 15 and 31 days respectively.
Policies
https://www.dau.edu/acquipedia/pages/articledetails.aspx#!188
Click here for excerpts from full JCIDS Manual linked above
APPENDIX B TO ENCLOSURE A
JCIDS URGENT/EMERGENT PROCESS
- Overview.
This appendix provides the overview of the urgent/emergent staffing
processes for Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) and Joint Emergent
Operational Needs (JEONs) in support of urgent capability acquisition of
solutions, including those potentially addressed by non-materiel solutions and
service contracting efforts.
1.2 Purpose.
1.2.1 The urgent/emergent staffing process is designed to facilitate rapid
identification, prioritization, documentation, communication, and validation of
urgent or emergent capability requirements related to ongoing or anticipated
contingency operations which, if not satisfied in an expedited manner, would
result in loss of life or critical mission failure. Solution Sponsors have 2 years
to field a capability solution in the urgent/emergent process.
1.2.1.1 Urgent requirements are those that present an urgent capability gap
to the warfighter that must be addressed within a two-year timeframe from the
date of validation.
1.2.1.2 Emergent requirements are those that present a capability gap to
the warfighter due to changes in threat, environment or emergent adversary
capability and TTPs that must be addressed within a two-year timeframe from
the date of validation.
…
- JCIDS Urgent/Emergent Process.
2.1 JCIDS Urgent/Emergent Needs. The review and validation process for
JUONs and JEONs emphasizes speed to enable approaches that rapidly deliver
capability solutions to the joint warfighter for an ongoing or anticipated
contingency operation. The capability solution fielded in response to a JUON
or JEON may not fully satisfy the validated requirements. Compromises may
be required in areas such as cost, interoperability, sustainability, training, etc.
to mitigate capability gaps within the operational timeframe. Partial and
interim capability solutions may be considered to meet the operational
timeline.
2.2 JCIDS Interaction with Urgent Capability Acquisition. Figure A-16 depicts
the interaction between JCIDS and the Urgent Capability Acquisition Process.
Once validated, JUONs, JEONs, and DoD Component UONs allow initiation of
urgent capability acquisition activities to develop and implement capability
solutions in a shorter timeframe than typical of deliberate MCA processes.
These urgent capability acquisition activities may also include expedited
procurement of Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS), Government Off-the-Shelf
(GOTS), and/or Non-Developmental Item (NDI) solutions, or
modification/acceleration of ongoing development programs initiated under the
deliberate process. Urgent capability acquisition in response to validated
JUONs, JEONs, and DoD Component UONs will be accomplished IAW
Reference [26].
2.3 Criteria.
Use of JUONs and JEONs are limited to circumstances requiring the
fielding of urgent capability to the Joint Force. JUONs and JEONs are used
ONLY when all other means of addressing the need are not practical for
satisfying the capability within the two-year timeframe. Requirement Sponsors
must be able to affirmatively answer the following questions:
2.3.1.1 JUONs. Are requested capabilities being driven by on-going
contingency operations necessary to prevent loss of life or critical mission
failure?
2.3.1.2 JEONs. Are requested capabilities that are driven by anticipated
contingency operations necessary to prevent loss of life or critical mission
failure?
2.3.2 Both JUONs and JEONs must have an initial capability solution fielded
within a two-year timeframe.
2.4 JCIDS Urgent/Emergent Staffing Timelines. All participants (requirement
sponsor, FCB, etc.) will work to adhere to the required timelines which may
include the convening of out-of-schedule WGs, FCBs and JCBs as required.
Requests for acceleration or extension of staffing timelines may be submitted to
the Joint Staff Gatekeeper on a case-by-case basis. Additional artifacts
(Assessment of Operational Utility (AOU), Modifications, Revalidation, etc.) are
outlined within this appendix.
2.5 JUON Validation Timeline. Figure A-17 presents the JUON staffing
timeline. JUON staffing takes no more than 15 days upon receipt of Validation
Authority approval to enter the Urgent Capability Acquisition pathway. This
includes one-day for the Joint Staff Gatekeeper to assign a Lead FCB for triage,
and 14 days for the FCB to conduct triage and present a validation
recommendation to the Validation Authority. Exigent circumstances may
require more expeditious staffing to assess the JUON’s urgency.
2.6 JEON Validation Timeline. Figure A-18 presents the JEON staffing
timeline. JEON staffing takes no longer than 31 days upon receipt of
Validation Authority approval to enter the Urgent Capability Acquisition
pathway. This includes 1 day for the Joint Staff Gatekeeper to assign a Lead
FCB for triage and 30 days for the FCB to conduct review, prepare a
recommendation, and schedule the JCB. The JROC is the Validation Authority
for JEONs unless delegated by the VCJCS to the JCB.
…
3.2.5.2 The first assessment for JUONs and JEONs is identifying the reason
for the urgent or emergent need. For example, what has changed in strategic
guidance, the global context, threats, and/or ongoing or anticipated
contingency operations, which now requires a different action than approved in
the Service POMs, previous requirements, acquisition decisions and merit
higher prioritization than all non-urgent/emergent requirements that
necessitates out-of-cycle funding to initiate?
3.2.5.3 The Lead FCB will assess whether there are any timelier approaches to
address the urgent or emergent need in place of pursuing a new capability
solution.
3.2.5.4 The Lead FCB and JRAC will consider COTS/GOTS/NDI solutions as
well as the potential to deploy early prototypes from ongoing acquisition
programs or Science and Technology (S&T) efforts as a rapid means to address
the capability gap identified in the JUON or JEON.
So documents need to explain, from a US perspective:
“ongoing or anticipated contingency operations which, if not satisfied in an expedited manner, would result in loss of life or critical mission failure.”
The “operational timeline” could be as short as confidently stated by the head Ukraine’s Military Intelligence (to a journalist) - turning point starts last half of August (next month), war won by end of the year. That’s “kind of tight”, but one also has to prepare for the possibility that it takes longer than that to win.
Fortunately process can be fast. See Figure A- 16: Interaction of JCIDS Urgent/Emergent Path and Urgent Capability Acquisition Process. p A-B-3 pdf 73 of 399.
Shows pre-development in days, development and production and deploymet in months.
Assigning JCIDS resources to actually study feasability, necessity and urgency of such proposals
can only be tasked by the US President/SecDef or a Combatant Commander (in this case CDR EUCOM):
https://www.eucom.mil/spotlight/eucoms-support-for-ukraine
My Concept of Operations (CONOPS) is to prepare briefing for Ukraine Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Digital Transformation and Executive Office of the Presidency that results in them assigning a team with the necessary Subject Matter Epertise (SME) to decide whether and if so how, to negotiate JCIDS tasking via both channels since JCIDS UONs can only be tasked from highest levels.
Implementation of the systems integration process for networked “Drome Army” in Ukraine ought to be funded from both US National Intelligence Program as it enhances NGA capabilities and US Military Programs as it both enables interoperability with any future US/NATO deployments and helps avoid the necessity for such deployments and provides enhanced capabilities and reduction in procurement costs also relevant to US military UAVS.
Click for funding Gatekeepers
APPENDIX C TO ENCLOSURE A
GATEKEEPING
2.1.4 JCIDS documents for capabilities funded by a combination of National
Intelligence Program (NIP) and Military Intelligence Program (MIP) funds are
submitted to the Joint Staff Gatekeeper to enable a common Gatekeeper
function between JCIDS and the Intelligence Community Capability
Requirements (ICCR) process.
I don’t currently know how to write such a briefing. But I am “willing to learn”.
So that’s my actual level of delusion - not trying to take on the Russian military machine in my back shed - nah - too easy - Ukrainians have already done that. Something far more grandiosely delusional - trying to get the American military procurement system to take it on quickly in THEIR back shed.
Possibly in light of reports of arms smuggling within Ukraine and in response to directions from NATO that no NATO donated weaponry be used outside Ukraine borders, UA has implemented stricter controls on accountability of arms used and stored.
Merchant ships brought in to ship grains may therefore be inspected on exit as well as entry.
If you are referring to link bellow it is about a different program, not the “Phoenix Ghost” loitering munition. That is a very interesting “Phoenix” program but it was already posted by @wannabe followed by an extensive response from me.
If that is not the article you were pointing to, please post the direct link.
As well as being generally easier to just copy and paste from address bar to a separate line in comment and then easier for readers to find by simply clicking, posting the direct link also provides an alert from the discourse software when the link has already been provided by somebody else - as it just did for me.
PS thanks for the mention of Rear-Admiral comments on Navy UAVs which I have filed away in Zotero so that I have the actual link and can simply copy and paste it like this even though it is not currently in my browser address bar and I am merely remembering what topic I selected when I clicked on the Zotero icon on my browser after finding it from your pointer:
Thanks for the pointer re Zotero. I will try this!
Time for a little update thread on Ukraine. We are at a very interesting point. A 
A couple of weeks ago (or so) the Russians announced an ‘operational pause’ in the Donbas. Op pauses are pretty normal in this type of high intensity warfare, because of the vast supplies required and damages inflicted.
Armies sometime just have to take ‘time outs’ to regroup and build up their supplies again. Although normally you don’t broadcast to everyone that you’re doing it. That’s a big weird an makes it seem like there must be another reason that Russian military activity has decreased.
And decreased it has - Russian artillery fire has significantly dropped, and there are a lot less offensives. (They compensated for this by lobbing a few missiles into cites, just to remind everyone they were still there, and still relevant. As if we’d all forgotten!)
And during this RUSSIAN operational pause, the Ukrainians started bringing into action the longer-range, western-donated artillery systems.
And continuing a theme (of the last two months) - while the Russians were focussing on (regrouping in) Donbas, the Ukrainians started hitting targets on the Kherson front in the south.
Just a quick reminder - Kherson is much more important strategically - it is the only foothold that the Russians have north and west of the Dnipro River - which is the major strategic barrier that runs across Ukraine from Crimea to Kyiv.
It is also the route to Crimea for the Ukrainians, which is where they should put pressure on the Russians if they want to evict them from the whole country. If the Russians feel threatened in Crimea they will strip units out of elsewhere, including the Donbas.
Anyway, I digress.
Over the last fortnight or so, the Ukrainians have been hitting Command and Control posts up to the 70km range of the new systems (headquarters, communications sites, air defence radars etc.). This dislocates a military force.
This sort of range means that generally speaking they are hitting Brigade and Divisional HQs rather than company and battalion ones. In a war you keep the more valuable things further from a front line to protect them. Longer range artillery upsets this calculation.
Secondly, the Ukrainians have been hitting supply dumps. I’m sure we’ve all seen the videos and photos on twitter. Judging by the size of those fires they were brigade, divisional and corps level supply dumps - which are predominantly fuel and ammo.
And specifically for the Russians and the way that they conduct war - it means a lot of artillery ammunition.
This has meant that the Russians have had to move all of these supply dumps back beyond the range of the new Ukrainian artillery. And this has one very simple effect.
The Russians now have to transport all those supplies, say, 100km rather than 30km. And if you have the same amount of lorries it means you can only bring up 1/3 of the supplies that you could before you had to move your supply dumps. And what does that mean?
It means that Russia, who rely on a very artillery heavy way of fighting war (and artillery is the most logistics intensive thing ever), can probably no longer get enough supplies up to the front line to conduct offensives; they can probably only defend on the Kherson front now.
And, I guess as the cherry on the cake, the Ukrainians have started hitting the bridges over the river Dnipro that connect Kherson to the other side of the river. In other words, the bridges to the Russian force’s rear.
There are only two of them. And they haven’t destroyed them yet, they’ve just cratered them making them unsuitable for heavy logistics. But if I were a Russian soldier in Kherson I would be pretty scared right now.
The way to get an enemy force to collapse is to hit their command and control, hit their logistics, and then start playing games with their minds.
I would be watching Kherson very closely over the next ten days. I think we might be about to see another Russian ‘goodwill’ gesture as they pull out of Kherson 
ENDS
Belongs in the hot chick thread 
I would have said that it is even worse than that. My complete guess would be rather than 1/3, the extra distance would result in 1/4 of the supplies, due to flow on of the extra fuel requirements.
TLDR - Putin is releasing the Ukrainian grain partly to get more income from Russian ag exports, partly to address diplomatic crisis with African and Middle Eastern nations that were in a dire food predicament. Russia wanted to create a refugee crisis for EU to solve. Can create a gas crisis instead, so has plenty of pointy problems remaining.
Also, Russia has started to bomb the Odessa grain port immediately after signing this export agreement.