Russia’s Rebound
How Moscow Has Partly Recovered From Its Military Setbacks
As one would expect from Barry R Posen of the notorious US Foreign Policy establishment, this article, of Janurary 3 archived here is actively promoting defeatism as made explicit in the conclusion:
If it wanted to, the United States could develop a diplomatic strategy to reduce maximalist thinking in both Ukraine and Russia. But to date, it has shown little interest in using its leverage to even try to coax the two sides to the negotiating table. Those of us in the West who recommend such a diplomatic effort are regularly shouted down. If this bloody, costly, and risky stalemate continues for another year, perhaps that will change.
They will persist, as they did in opposing the Arab Spring and in leaving the Syrian people to the Assad regime with Russian support. At the moment they are indeed being shouted down, but they have succeeded before and have a very long tradition of “America First” isolationism to draw on.
So it is worth responding to their arguments as well as shouting them down.
This is not a war that is simply cascading in Ukraine’s favor. Rather, it is turning into a war of attrition, a contest in which any gains by either side will come only at great cost. Even the dim outlines of this future should make both Ukraine and Russia wish to avoid it, but neither country seems ready to negotiate, much less make the difficult compromises that might provide the ingredients of a settlement.
Ukraine and its backers may hope that Russia comes to its senses and simply abandons the war, but that outcome looks unlikely. They may also hope for a Russian collapse at the front or at home, but the chances of either scenario are also slim. The most promising course would be for the United States to nudge the two sides to the negotiating table, since only Washington has the power to do so. But it has decided not to do so. And so the war goes on, at a tragic human cost.
I think the first paragraph is accurate, with arguments supporting it quoted below. The obvious and natural conclusion is that more should be done to assist Ukraine and defeat the fascist aggression. To avoid responding to that natural impulse the article simply assumes that the readers (who are after all US “foreign policy establishment”) are purely outsiders with no stake in whether fascists are allowed to resume periodically plunging the world into wars of aggression or not. The argument for remaining indifferent is so completely non-existant that he has no alternative but to simply take it for granted that his prejudices are shared by his readers.
The second is insidious. Ukraine clearly not only “hopes” but has no alternative to fighting until a Russian collapse at the front and/or at home.
The same “supporters” who initially expected swift Russian victory and opposed sending arms that might “provoke” Moscow and that would “only prolong” the war, continue to simply proclaim that “the chances of either scenario are also slim”. They habitually cover themselves with pious concern for the “tragic human cost”. Some believe it, just as some believed it would be less “costly” to appease fascism in the lead up to WW2.
There is no point speculating as to whether Barry Posen actually believes what he is pushing. But there is no doubt he will keep pushing it regardless of the evidence. As he confessed:
In July, I argued that the war was stalemated. Given Ukraine’s subsequent successes in liberating territory in and around the cities of Kherson and Kharkiv, my assessment was clearly premature.
The abysmal “assessment” that was proved wrong in July was:
Ukraine’s Implausible Theories of Victory
The Fantasy of Russian Defeat and the Case for Diplomacy
It is archived here.
Since it is predetermined that his prejudices are what he will continue to push, he calls it “premature” instead of simply “wrong” and just regurgitates exactly the same claims.
His argument is simply that the Russian regime cannot accept defeat, so it must be accommodated. That is why Hitler had to be appeased instead of defeated. It is quite literally inconceivable to this writer that anything other than the current Tsarist fascist autocracy could govern Russia so he does not bother to discuss whether its refusal to accept defeat in Ukraine might be linked to its own estimate that it could not survive defeat.
In July last year that did not stop him from echoing the fascist hints that they might destroy the world with nuclear weapons unless they are appeased.To be fair there has been some progress, in January the word “nuclear” does not appear in his regurgitation. Also note the more subdued tone in the title of the current version than in the previous one.
So does he have anything at all useful to contribute? I think he does:
Like the mobilization, Russia’s withdrawal from the city of Kherson in November made military sense. As Putin himself observed, the line of contact between Russian and Ukrainian forces was long, stretching nearly 1,000 miles, and Russian forces were spread thin. Ukraine’s successful breakthrough in Kharkiv in September shortened the front that Russia had to defend to roughly 600 miles. But even that was not short enough. Russian forces had their necks stuck out on the west side of the Dnieper River at Kherson. The intelligent decision militarily was to withdraw them, and after much vacillation and considerable Ukrainian military pressure, that was exactly what Russia did. That Putin was willing to do something that he clearly did not wish to do suggests that he now has some confidence in his commanders—and that some of them are giving sound military advice.
There is no denying that the Russians were forced to retreat, and the mere fact that they had to do so no doubt upset Putin. But the Russians pulled off one of the hardest military operations: retreating during a major attack without suffering the disintegration or annihilation of their forces. It was no small feat to move some 20,000 soldiers and most of their combat equipment across the Dnieper after Ukrainian forces had destroyed key bridges. And even while under intense intelligence surveillance by the West and Ukraine, they managed to maintain the element of surprise. Up to the end, no one in Ukraine or in NATO seemed to be quite sure that Russian forces were leaving. Their rear-guard units maintained a coherent defense, even though they must have known that their comrades closer to the river were escaping.
Somehow, the Russians managed to repair damaged bridges while under fire, throw up pontoon bridges, and employ ferries to get their people and equipment out, defending each avenue of escape from Ukrainian attack. The Ukrainian army will now have to fight these units somewhere else, perhaps under less favorable conditions. If only through a Darwinian process, the Russian army has at last found some competent planners and battlefield commanders.
By all accounts, the Russians are settling in to defend the shorter front that their tactical defeats and retreats have produced—and doing so with newly reinforced combat units. According to press reports and satellite imagery, Russian troops are digging defensive positions all along the line of contact and constructing sequential barriers of concrete obstacles and bunkers. They are also presumably seeding the ground with mines, a simple and time-honored weapon of the Russian military. More fully manned units on shorter fronts and well-prepared defensive positions are the ingredients of a potentially effective defense. Unless Russian military morale truly collapses and produces mass mutinies and desertions, the Ukrainians will have to undertake the bloody work of evicting those units from their new positions.
Above strikes me as more useful than endless cheerleading for Ukraine.
The obvious conclusion is that more needs to be done to assist the competent Russian commanders in competently retreating from Ukraine. eg ATACMS, air defense, tanks, artillery etc and if necessary direct combat intervention in collective defence.
But instead of that natural response we get:
Putin may hope that this approach ultimately brings Ukraine to the bargaining table. Or he may simply hope that the never-ending costs will cause Ukraine to gradually cease its attacks without conceding anything, resulting in another frozen conflict. Very few people know what Russia’s overall war strategy is, if it even has one. It is also possible that the recent period of reasonable military decisions and competent implementation will turn out to be a blip rather than a harbinger. The most mysterious question now is whether Russia’s efforts to train large numbers of combat capable units will work. And it is an open question whether Moscow has, or can manufacture or import, the weapons and ammunition needed for another year of intense combat. But if it can generate these new units and continue to fight sensibly, the war may continue in its present form: a brutal slugfest.
Very few people may know what Putin’s war strategy is. But Posen does know that Putin wants the US to drag Ukraine to the bargaining table and is anxious to help.
Terrific to see such private efforts to provide aid to Ukrainians, is an alternative to the high overhead , selfpromotion by some NGO’s.
Whisper’s are coming out of Bahkmut. Russians have retreated and moved to Solidar Thousands of Russian dead bodies left behind .
Could be both real assessment of reports from troops discussing surrender plans and “reaping” that discord in order to “sow” it for a future harvest.
Thread has lots of comments about PsyOps but it would only be useful to sow such “discord” if there were already seeds that had been “reaped”.
Inventing it would be unhelpful. Encouraging it whether or not an offensive is expected to break through in Luhansk would be useful and does not reduce any perplexity among Russian commanders as to whether there will or will not be an offensive in Luhansk and whether to reinforce troops or denounce potential surrenders.
Like the NGOs employing Ukrainians on the ground there in delivering essentials and with an understanding of needs and with networks?
As compared to a venture capitalist from Sydney raising funds through Go Fund Me, doing publicity snaps in an ambulance?
Yeah I don’t trust him one bit. Seems to flip flop depending on which way the wind is blowing
Erdogan has an election coming up that he’s a good chance to lose. Judge everything he does in that context, what are the pure selfish electoral implications.
I didn’t think elections under Erdogan were actually legit
Manipulated but not falsified is the vibe I get. He still wants to win semi-legitimately.
Russia’s Anti-Putin Underground
Great Video!
Interesting channel from Anarcho-Communists. As the video says it is affinity groups of people with various different views who understand:
If not us, who?
If not now, when?
Partisan operations that spread the word are actually a combination of military and political struggle, not just military.
Edit add: Some link re this particular group, BOAK:
(above wikipedia page also has links to other Russian opposition organizations)
Interview with BOAK at libertarian communist web site:
Report in US media Vice:
Report in UK revolutionary socialist web site:
That’s cool.
Subtle nudge to Germany.
A whole lot more cringe
Death does not exist. Well, if death does not exist then it logically follows that life does not exist either. Morons.
Hope your partner’s family are coping during these hard times for civilians in Ukraine.