you are quibbling about nothing.
There is a wide gap in what western intelligence let out and what western media infers and reports.
To clarify, you cannot just declare an offensive operation over and immediately switch to stability operations. The expectations of the russians to topple the gov in 3 to 4 days was real; another few days to clear the remnants of coordinated resistance and switch forces to the stability tasks. That last part takes a lot longer than 6 days - the forces that do the assault are not the same forces that can do stability operations successfully. Although, it is clear that the russians have not learned anything from Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Syria - (neither has the USA for that matter)
BTW this is underreported: RF blowing up reservoirs in Annivka, Peremozhe, Mykhailivka. Russians started flooding that axis at least a month ago. This paints a picture of a deliberate strategy of flooding, not some accidents.
I said the Russian captured documents show they expected to be starting stability operations in 10 days, and that this cannot be interpreted as expecting to finish them quickly - Russian stability operations in Afghanistan being an example (Emphasized words added together with emphasis).
Unless I have misunderstood you seem to be saying the same thing and adding further examples of Russian experience of how long âstabilizationâ takes and how successful it isnât - Chechnya and Syria as well as Afghanistan.
They certainly havenât learned not to get into another one. But you havenât offered anything in support of the idea that was spread that they believed it would be âall over by day 4â.
They did hope to kill the government leadership (not âtopple the governmentâ) in 3-4 days by a airborne special forces that were ambushed at Hostomel - and astoundingly it seems they had no plausible backup plan.
Western journalists have been pretending that means they expected it to be âall over by day 4â.
I havenât seen any original briefings from intelligence agencies to journos but would not be surprised if the agencies were more nuanced. Something like âwe estimate with high confidence that it is likely blah blah blahâ.
If there is some example of a statement attributed to a senior intelligence official correcting the impressions conveyed by journos who got their briefings wrong at the time, please link to it. I did not notice one.
The notion of any meaningful difference between media reports of Russian expectations of winning in three or four days, and Russian documents aiming for stabilising measures by day 10, seem rather forced.
An overview of the daily events in the war between Russia and Ukraine. A day marked by evacuation of residents of the Kherson region and hysterical messages from Russian channels about a possible offensive in the Zaporizhzia region. https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1666543481051918337?s=20
Rasmussen said: âIf Nato cannot agree on a clear path forward for Ukraine, there is a clear possibility that some countries individually might take action. We know that [Poland](https://www.theguardian.com/world/poland) is very engaged in providing concrete assistance to Ukraine. And I wouldnât exclude the possibility that Poland would engage even stronger in this context on a national basis and be followed by the Baltic states, maybe including the possibility of troops on the ground.