They have put a different spin on things this time around, they had to, as RU is the one that has invaded a smaller neighbour.
1 Like
@elfm I know your experience far outstrips mine and appreciate the time you spend on this. The following is opinion.
Ukraine is running a fighting withdrawal because of its poor offensive prospects, not because it is the ideal way to confront an aggressor. Of course at a micro level active defence cannot be “hold to the last” but this is a steady rollback at present. Concentration of force can let an army conquer a larger adversary, but so far counter attacks against Moscow have been blunted.
In other words, while at the tactical level sacrificing a position or even a village may be sound it does not win a war. Winning a war is still in the big picture about gaining territory- not to say the war is finally won, but the occupier is in the ascendant. It is why Ukraine constantly insists on return of its territory and Russia incorporates occupied (or nearly occupied) oblasts into its constitutional borders.
It is important to undermine Russia in every practical way- sanctions, infrastructure attacks, partisans, propaganda, etc. However waiting to bleed Russia dry is not the desired strategy- North Korea, Iran, China and India can all prop up Russia in various ways. Killing a thousand Russians and North Koreans and losing 400 Ukrainians will not win. A long war may even help shore up Putin’s control by justifying the flattening of dissent and resistance.
The long war is just the best option Ukraine has without more manpower and better weapons.
11 Likes
I think a long war hurts Putin more than its hurts UA. Particularly if RU casualty numbers continue on the same upward trajectory.
5 Likes
Right, recovery of land would be the desired outcome. The strategy part is the tricky one. At the strategic level, UA’s options are few. They have been doing the right strategic things, mostly - except for the recent debacle of the 155 Bde - Zelensky and all the key ministers have been tirelessly traveling the world, shoring up support, building up the armed services, fomenting innovation and reinvigorating the national defense industry. But still lack the capabilities and numbers to take on the Russians in all fronts.
At the operational and tactical level the performance of UA is very spotty; some formations and units have worked very well, some not so much when faced with the same challenges: overstretched, lack of ammo and equipment. The well trained units have looked at avoiding the RU strengths and attacked the vulnerabilities; this was seen with the deception plan implemented for the recapture of Kharkiv and Kherson - drawing RU units away from one area in order to strike at a weaker force; also with the Kursk incursion: they saw an opportunity to bring the fight to RU soil which would draw the attention of the RU leadership and spread their force thinner. In these areas the local UA commanders have skillfully defended against concentration of RU forces attacking by withdrawing under pressure, drawing in the RU elements into a killzone to finish them off - trading space in order to inflict heavy losses and eventually counter attack when the conditions are right. In other areas we have seen the opposite, UA commanders not allowing elements to withdraw and preserve its force (this should be a top priority: preserve for son that you can counter-attack as the RU assault thins out or culminates); such is the case in the area around Pokrost to the south where several units were told to hold a meaningless town or piece of ground until they were surrounded and captured, and many killed.
Bottom line is I agree with your conclusion that UA is short of options at the strategic and operational/tactical level until they can generate more, much more, combat power (combination of soldiers, equipment, leadership, and doctrine to go with it); and yes, in the short term, taking stock of the immediate situation, it may seem like RU is ‘winning’, but in a longer view, we are seeing the conditions that can bring a collapse of the RU forces ability to fight - hopefully, before the UAs, and give the UA forces the opportunity to recover territories. It would help, as you implied, if the west can enforce and extend sanctions on those countries and companies that support RU war effort. China has been careful not to be seen as directly supporting RU; India would also be more careful if it affects its economic and strategic interests (they are always in a keen competition with China; one would fill the gap if the other backs down a bit), but at the moment they are making a killing with cheap energy from RU.
The elephant in the room is what is a crazy, cornered cat going to do with a last ditch nuclear arsenal at his disposal when everything else is failing.
Going back to the comment about Russia’s centre of gravity, I should add the Russian people’s attitude about the war and their willingness to make sacrifices in support of the ‘fatherland’ as other commenter alluded earlier. How long will that last is a key question.
P.S. I should add that the UA forces have learned quite a bit and are adapting to the more manoeuvre warfare approach. Still a ways to go, but some of the successes they have had are evidence of that. They need to continue enhancing comms, coordination, synchronization of effects and trust. For their side, RU is learning also and cutting down the lag between UA innovation to their response. However, I remain optimistic.
16 Likes
Good morning Blitzers.
There’s currently a fair bit of gloomy news about regarding Ukraine. As Bomber supporters, we’re probably conditioned to doom and gloom, but just like Ukraine, await a new, brighter sunrise. Go Bombers. Slava Ukraini.
Rights! You want rights?
Mrs Sine says I’ve been using gas as a weapon for years.
A quick summation of… everything.
This should be a Pole.
Just more of Russia being bastards, even to their own people.
Finland says “No thanker” to UAE.
Don’t feed the Bear.
The Bear wants it all, and wants it now.
A differing opinion and proposition about the war and on ways to end it.
Trump’s strength? I never knew lying was a considered a strength.
A short, gloomy Ukrainian appraisal of last year.
A more in-depth appraisal of last year and the likelihood of the war’s continuance.
Vlad The Butcher.
Tanks, but no tanks.
Russian tank production can’t offset losses in Ukraine war
Where the Orcs are winning.
And this, unfortunately.
Rationalising (making excuses for) the USA’s lack of enthusiasm to assist.
Sadly, I present this…
Hope is eternal. A game changer?
Ukraine’s Trembita missile: A cost-effective game changer
Fickle Fico sees the Slovakian peasants as revolting.
3 Likes
2/ An account published by the VChK-OGPU Telegram channel, which has often published information that appears to have been leaked from sources in the Russian security forces, describes some of the preliminary findings of the official Russian criminal investigation.
3/ It reports that Grozny was guarded by the following air defence systems: two Pantsirs, an S-300 (recently delivered from Syria) and a Buk air defense system. One of the Pantsirs was installed in the Visaitovsky district north-west of Grozny.
4/ The Pantsir unit had only recently been installed there after the same area was targeted by Ukrainian long-range drones earlier in December. Its three-man crew – commander, operator and driver – were interrogated by the Russian Investigative Commmittee.
5/ According to VChK-OGPU, "their air defence system fired two missiles: at 08:13:30 and at 08:13:40. The missiles exploded at 8:13:50 and 8:14:30. The latter explosion hit the plane."
6/ "According to the [Pantsir commander], the orders to launch both missiles were given from Rostov, by a commander named Borisov.
7/ "When asked about the targets, the combat vehicle commander explained that such a powerful electronic warfare system was in operation that it “jammed” not only civilian but also military equipment. This also affected the operation of the air defense missile system.
8/ "For some reason, the plane was not displayed in “green” on the air defense missile system’s radar. He believed that he had an unspecified target.
9/ "A direct question was asked whether he understood that there was a civilian plane in the kill zone, since the aircraft was flying at an altitude that was not typical for drones and had different parameters from the UAV.
10/ "The commander did not give a clear answer, explaining that an order was given for each “launch,” but the plane was not displayed on the air defence missile system as a civilian aircraft. Like, how did he know whose plane it was?
11/ "The “new” timing confirms the version that the plane was hit by one of the missiles fired from the Pantsir. According to updated data, the impact on board occurred even earlier, not at 8:16, but at around 8:14.
12/ "Investigators came to this conclusion after carefully listening to the audio file of the conversations between the dispatcher and the plane’s crew.
13/ "If this moment was marked as “inaudible” in the transcript (most likely on purpose, so that there was no time connection between the missile explosions and the “impact” on the plane), then in the audio you can hear: “a bird hit me.”
14/ "Two minutes later, the crew repeated this more clearly.
According to new data, ground services record that the plane was 16 kilometers from the airport at 8:14, but still over the same Naursky District.
15/ "Returning to the testimony of the combat vehicle commander, it turned out that the SAM crews are not informed of the flight schedule of civilian aircraft at all.
In order to launch the missiles, the commander called Rostov twice via landline communications.
16/ At the same time, the crew allegedly could not visually observe the target due to fog, [according to] testimony given by the shift commander servicing the SAM.
17/ "But the commander of the second Pantsir, which is based at the airport, observed the civilian aircraft with his own eyes and did not fire at it.
18/ "This became known after listening to the background recording from the control room. The SAM commander informed the dispatcher by radio that he was observing an aircraft within sight.
19/ "Investigators asked the crew commander why he did not contact the commander of the other combat vehicle. And he replied that they had “problems” with landline communications. And the cellular communications did not work due to electronic warfare …
20/ "Specialists have still not been able to establish the electronic warfare of which unit or organization carried out such a powerful “jammer” that nothing worked in the planes or in the air defence systems.
21/ “So far, no one has confessed to the EW, and the special equipment on site (border guards brought in a special vehicle) has not yielded any clues. The jammer’s signal was recorded for another day after the tragedy, and then disappeared.”
22/ VChK-OGPU reports that the Russian authorities are trying to concoct a more palatable version of events, that “the missiles from the Pantsir were fired at [a Ukrainian] drone, they missed the target and unsuccessfully self-destructed near the AZAL plane.”
23/ In this version, the plane was simply in the wrong place at the wrong time, rather than the Pantsir having fired at it by mistake. The Investigative Committee’s head Alexander Bastrykin has reportedly given a priority order to find the remains of the supposed UAV.
24/ However, there seems to be no evidence of a drone existing. VChK-OGPU says, “the personnel of the Russian Guard have been combing an area of about 40 square kilometers for a second day in search of parts of the drone. And they can’t find it.” /end
Sources:
t.me/vchkogpu/53683t.me/vchkogpu/53684t.me/vchkogpu/53685
• • •
4 Likes
Trucking Futin unrelenting.
Fickle Fico quite a DickO’.
Russia’s warm-water naval port (not currently attended) has environmental damage caused by some idiotic, pirating rogue nation. I can only hope Russia sues the swine responsible.
A few small victories - NK military paying the price.
T for poo and poo for T.
Ja, ja, sanctions not apply to Deutschland.
Pokrovsk - a place to die for.
Good. But India should be dragged, yelling and kicking, back into sanction compliance.
Import of oil from Russia falls 13 per cent in December
Another article about Russia saying, “We are not amused.”
The UK barring its teeth.
I have a cunning plan.
A backhander to NATO
Things are crook for Bear outlook.
Frontline update- 30 minutes ago
6 Likes
So window, tea or torture pits…
Appeal to Putin to end the war
7 Likes
Crunchy horror: the night doctor Ptahiv Magyar is working, - a view from the dugout
Хробачий жах: працює нічний доктор Птахів Мадяра,- погляд з бліндажу
1 Like
Bump!
3 Likes
3 Likes
1 Like
Bump
2 Likes
Electric Power, Natural Gas
December 29, 2024
Russia’s Gazprom will halt gas supplies to Moldova’s Moldovagaz as of Jan 1
By Rosemary Griffin and Stuart Elliott
HIGHLIGHTS
To stop deliveries over debts, payments dispute
Moldova previously disputed level of debts to Gazprom
Jan. 1 key date in future Russian gas supplies to Europe
Gazprom will suspend natural gas deliveries to Moldova’s Moldovagaz starting on Jan. 1 over outstanding gas debts and payment issues, the Russian gas giant said Dec. 28.
In a statement on its official Telegram channel, Gazprom said that Moldova had refused to settle debts accrued for gas supplies and that Moldovagaz had regularly failed to meet its payment obligations under the current contract.
It said that supplies would fall to zero at 8:00 Moscow time on Jan. 1, with the restriction set to remain in effect until it notified Moldovagaz otherwise.
“Gazprom reserves all rights, including the right to unilaterally terminate the contract and demand compensation from Moldovagaz for all losses and payment of fines for Moldovagaz’s failure to fulfill and/or improper fulfillment of its obligations under the contract,” the Russian company said.
Moldova’s gas demand is split between the Republic of Moldova on the right bank of the Dniester (around 1.2 Bcm/year) and the more industrialized breakaway region of Transnistria on the left bank (2.1 Bcm/year).
Under the contract with Moldovagaz, Gazprom currently supplies some 5.7 million cu m/d of gas via Ukraine, which is redirected for consumption to Transnistria.
The Republic of Moldova no longer consumes Russian gas and instead uses imports from neighboring European countries.
However, the supply of gas to Transnistria is key to Moldova because it is supplied with electricity from the MGRES thermal power station in the breakaway region.
Moldova declared a 60-day state of emergency Dec. 16 due to the “major risk” to energy security across the country.
Moldovagaz purchases
In a statement Dec. 28, Moldovagaz said it had taken note of Gazprom’s decision to halt supplies as of Jan. 1.
“Moldovagaz has contracted the necessary volumes of gas, which will fully ensure the consumption of the right bank of the Dniester until the end of March 2025,” it said.
It stressed that the 5.7 million cu m/d of supply from Gazprom was redirected by Moldovagaz to the Transnistria region.
Moldova has warned that if gas supplies to Transnistria were halted, there was a risk that the region could collapse.
The decision by Gazprom also comes as the five-year gas transit agreement between Russia and Ukraine is due to expire at the end of 2024.
Without a new deal, deliveries to Transnistria had been due to be suspended in any event.
Russia currently supplies some 42 million cu m/d of gas to Europe via the Sudzha interconnection point on the border with Ukraine, supplying Slovakia, Austria and Italy as well as Moldova.
Russian President Vladimir Putin said Dec. 26 that it would be “impossible” to agree to any Ukrainian gas transit deal before the end of the year.
There have been proposals for alternative supplies via third parties including Azerbaijan, but these talks have so far failed to result in concrete agreements.
Gazprom had said Nov. 25 that it was looking at options for the continued supply of gas to Moldova after the Russia-Ukraine gas transit deal expires but no arrangements were put in place.
But Moldova’s energy ministry said Dec. 17 that Gazprom did not book any capacity in the Trans-Balkan gas pipeline route for the month of January in the latest monthly capacity auction.
Under its winter plan published earlier this year, the Moldovan ministry said one of its planning scenarios was that Gazprom could continue to provide gas to Transnistria but via a different route using the offshore TurkStream pipeline and the Trans-Balkan link.
But the auction results suggested Gazprom was not planning to use the route for deliveries to Transnistria.
Uncertainty around Russian gas supplies to Europe continue to weigh on prices. Platts assessed the Dutch TTF month-ahead contract at Eur47.435/MWh Dec. 27, up from Eur39.775/MWh on Dec. 16.
Debt dispute
Moldovagaz and Gazprom have long been in dispute about historical gas debts, which again came to the fore in 2023 following an external independent audit of the alleged debt.
Moldova’s energy ministry said in September 2023 that much of the debt claimed by Gazprom – said to total some $709 million – was “unconfirmed or at least unenforceable”.
The ministry said the government of Moldova – as a minority shareholder in Moldovagaz – proposed that Moldovagaz pay just $8.6 million following the results of the audit report.
Gazprom said at the time it “categorically” disagreed with the ministry’s comments and would defend its interests “in every possible way”.
Gazprom had already previously threatened to halt gas supplies to Moldovagaz if it did not settle its historical debts.
The Moldovan energy ministry, meanwhile, has already made a number of provisions aimed at securing electricity supply ahead of the likely end of Russian gas supplies to the Transnistria region.
Electricity consumption in winter reaches up to 850 MW during peak hours and the ministry said it would mobilize “all domestic sources of production”, including the combined heat and power plants of Termoelectrica and CET Nord which will cover consumption of around 200 MW.
Another 100 MW has already been contracted by state utility Energocom from the Cernavoda nuclear power plant in Romania at a capped price, while a further 100 MW is to be contracted from OMV Petrom’s Brazi thermal power plant.
The Costesti-Stanca hydropower plant in Romania can also cover up to 10 MW of consumption.
The ministry also said renewable energy sources in winter can deliver variable amounts of energy from 50 MW up to 150 MW in certain hours, depending on weather conditions, while up to 200 MW could be purchased from the Romanian electricity exchange OPCOM to cover consumption peaks.
4 Likes
I read this and have issues with an underlying assumption. RU claims that UA joining NATO was the reddest of red lines and the world should just accept that the RU invasion was then justified. Therefore granting a de facto justification if not tacit approval/permission to RU for their occupation of the invaded and occupied UA oblasts.
I reject this cheap justification. The RU invasion was unprovoked and not the actions of a great power, invading UA was the action of a failing/fading power, intent on trying to reassert its power base, by intimidating its smaller neighbours. The view expressed here is akin to a might is right stance.
5 Likes
3 Likes