WTF
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If your planes wings are welded onā¦
Simulation of how close the South West and FedEx aircraft got
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Windshear on landing
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Not sure if that was averted by excellent piloting by the FedEx crew, luck, or a combination of both. But yes, watching that did make me tense up a fair bit!
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ATC realized the ā ā ā ā -up and told the FedEx boys to abort. They may have already realized the situation as well.
Either way, clearance for the SouthWest aircraft should have never been given.
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The air traffic controller who gave the okay for the take-off, will be in big trouble over this incident. This was just too close a call. The plane coming in should have pulled out a lot sooner, it had good visibility, there was no good reason for it to get so close.
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Note that the video was a simulation, not ACTUAL videoā¦
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Yep, the tweet was not clear on that, hence I prefaced the post that it was a simulation.
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ā ā ā ā being shot / falling out of the sky everywhere in the US
Back to the Yeti crash and the Preliminary findings are quite a sorry read and it looks like itās absolutely clear that pilot area was the cause of the crash. Seems rather than adjust the flaps they have inadvertently adjusted the conditioning lever and put the propellers into feather mode
The take-off, climb, cruise and descent to Pokhara was normal. During the first contact with Pokhara tower the Air Traffic Controller (ATC) assigned the runway 30 to land. But during the later phases of flight crew requested and received clearance from ATC to land on Runway 12.
At 10:51:36, the aircraft descended (from 6,500 feet at five miles away from VNPR and joined the downwind track for Runway 12 to the north of the runway. The aircraft was visually identified by ATC during the approach. At 10:56:12, the pilots extended the flaps to the 15 degrees position and selected the landing gears lever to the down position. The take-off (TO) setting was selected on power management panel.
At 10:56:27, the PF disengaged the Autopilot System (AP) at an altitude of 721 feet Above Ground Level (AGL). The PF then called for āFLAPS 30ā at 10:56:32, and the PM replied, āFlaps 30 and descendingā. The flight data recorder (FDR) data did not record any flap surface movement at that time. Instead, the propeller rotation speed (Np) of both engines decreased simultaneously to less than 25%1 and the torque (Tq) started decreasing to 0%, which is consistent with both propellers going into the feathered condition. On the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) area microphone recording, a single Master Caution chime was recorded at 10:56:36. The flight crew then carried out the āBefore Landing Checklistā before starting the left turn onto the base leg. During that time, the power lever angle increased from 41% to 44%. At the point, Np of both propellers were recorded as Non-Computed Data (NCD) in the FDR and the torque (Tq) of both engines were at 0%. When propellers are in feather, they are not producing thrust.
When both propellers were feathered, the investigation team observed that both engines of 9N-ANC were running flight idle condition during the event flight to prevent over torque. As per the FDR data, all the recorded parameters related to engines did not show any anomaly. At 10:56:50 when the radio altitude callout for five hundred feet3 was annunciated, another āclickā sound was heard. The aircraft reached a maximum bank angle of 30 degrees at this altitude. The recorded Np and Tq data remained invalid. The yaw damper disconnected four seconds later. The PF consulted the PM on whether to continue the left turn and the PM replied to continue the turn. Subsequently, the PF asked the PM on whether to continue descend and the PM responded it was not necessary and instructed to apply a little power. At 10:56:54, another click was heard, followed by the flaps surface movement to the 30 degrees position.
When ATC gave the clearance for landing at 10:57:07, the PF mentioned twice that there was no power coming from the engines. At 10:57:11, the power levers were advanced first to 62 degrees then to the maximum power position. It was followed by a āclickā sound at 10:57:16. One second after the āclickā sound, the aircraft was at the initiation of its last turn at 368 feet AGL, the highpressure turbine speed (Nh) of both engines increased from 73% to 77%.
It is noted that the PF handed over control of the aircraft to the PM at 10:57:18. At 10:57:20, the PM (who was previously the PF) repeated again that there was no power from the engines. At 10:57:24 when the aircraft was at 311 feet AGL, the stick shaker was activated warning the crew that the aircraft Angle of Attack (AoA) increased up to the stick shaker threshold.
At 10:57:26, a second sequence of stick shaker warning was activated when the aircraft banked towards the left abruptly. Thereafter, the radio altitude alert for two hundred feet was annunciated, and the cricket sound and stick shaker ceased. At 10:57:32, sound of impact was heard in the CVR. The FDR and CVR stopped recording at 10:57:33 and 10:57:35 respectively.
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Stolen from elsewhere, but Iām sure will answer a few questions that report raises.
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On the ATR, are the condition levers and the flap lever adjacent to each other? Yes they are next to each other but I have never seen a crew mistake the two. Both CLs have independent triggers so it would require some thought and intent to lift both at the same time
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a. How are the condition levers and how is the flap lever protected against inadvertent movement? Latch triggers on the CLs. The Flap (which is ergonomically the shape of a flap needs to be lifted them placed into position.
b. Do the levers themselves have to be pulled out of a detent or is there a little latch mounted beneath the lever that has to be pulled to open the latch? Yes
c. Are there differences between the respective levers latch types or is the required action to unlatch the lever the same on both? As above, very very different levers and mechanisms
d. Are there differences between ATR subvariants? Yes but very minor, but a rather moot point. This crew (I believe) have only operated the 500 variant
I do know one former ATR pilot that has said this was the most likely cause right from the outset
You wonder how? While being adjacent, the controls are quite different.
I get it, some dumbos press the accelerator pedal instead of the brake pedal in their cars.
But these are professional pilots. And the gauges would have been screaming that no torque was being applied!
Was the PM (later PF) in the right or left seat? I can only come up with if they were sitting in the left hand seat they reached for the wrong lever due to muscle memory.
Itās definitely bizarre. The flight recordings indicated that both pilots knew about it too which is even more staggering. Just seems a total brain fade by both.
Reading it again it seems like the PM was asked for more flap, acknowledged it, but did not do select itā¦
Didnāt move the flap lever, but instead moved the condition levers?
Almost 30 seconds after being asked for the flap, moves them without comment, or apparently wondering what heād moved the first time.
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Any update on the China Eastern crash from 2022? Indications at the time were it may have been deliberate.
I think thatās where it stands. I suspect, being China, thatās as far as it goes. The indications are pretty clear that it was a deliberate action to crash the aircraft.
Yep, itās been tied off nicely. They wonāt speak of it again
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