It’s a good question from @Benny40 I’ll be getting back to you on that very narrow aspect of the answer - and the corresponding issue of how to block enemy UAV recce and relation of both to EW and counter artillery radar.
Up to now my focus has been on the network of data links required for UAV recce (and ISTAR) along a relatively static front line.
My assumption was (and is) that armies with substantial armoured maneuver capabilities already have reasonable doctrine and TTPs for organic UAVs at various levels but Ukraine is unique in having to establish a “Drone Army” for a positional artillery war which results in requirements for C4/EW that differ significantly but also need to interoperate with the CMOSS C4/EW standards for vehicle integration since both drone operators and launch and recovery teams and the C4 and actual drones and maintenance will move with infantry vehicles when the front line moves from time to time.
So I am assuming that both both Ground Control Station and UAV equipment will be on OpenVPX 3U HOST standard cards that fit well with at least US military vehicles and should also be familiar to producers of other NATO vehicles.
Now that armoured maneuver warfare is on the horizon I would like to exchange views on whether any other UAV issues relevant to Ukraine need to be adapted.
eg I had assumed operations center well to the rear of front lines and Light Armoured Vehicles transporting Drone Army equipment while relying on C3D Camouflage Concealment Cover and Deception plus some dispersion and mobility when at relatively static locations.
The “cover” and "mobility"I was thinking about was not heavy armour.
Now I am wondering how much room there is for additional 3U equipment in a heavy tank that communicates with both drones above and their operators in other Armoured vehicles on the move nearby?
Can we have a mobile drone operations center actually inside a moving armoured force rather than at the rear?
You could have mobile drone assets in humvees, close to the front but out of direct line of sight.
Challenge is the Mavic style drones which have become the baseline for organic drone surveillance are too slow and short range for a mobile force. Western militaries will cover this gap with strategic drones. Ukraine will need to do it with tactical drones, so has a challenge to use gear small enough to be mobile but large enough to keep up with tanks and IFVs.
I don’t think the strategic TB2 drone could survive Russia’s AA cover during a combined arms assault.
Tweet missed the point of his first preference for leading SMERSH personally rather than front line troops. It means “Death to Spies”. He wants to start shooting the opposition, and especially the opposition “infiltrated” in the army, rather than yelling at them pathetically, or boasts that he does. He certainly doesn’t want to go to the front.
It’s the “Seeing to be seen doing something” as well though. Uncle Sam could supply the lot but needs all the optics that everyone else is pulling their weight as well.
In relation to Abrams my understanding is that the specialized recovery vehicles that actually accompany the battalion are for replacing entire large assemblies (eg turret, engine) as the maintenance logistics HAS to be pushed forward instead of having delays while parts are pulled from the rear.
So I would assume any actual production and repair of these large asssemblies would be ENTIRELY outside Ukraine. There may be some in Europe in support of the Abrams stockpiled there but I imagine the flow would mainly be sealift and airlift where necessary from USA to West European stockpiles of complete replacement assemblies that then move as required to local pushed supplies for the specialized recovery vehicles closer to the front.
MSC 2022: Kaja Kallas on Soviet Negotiation Tactics
At the Munich Security Conference 2022, Estonia’s Prime Minister Kaja Kallas explained the negotiation tactics of the Soviet Union in light of Russia’s present-day demands to the West.
Yep. Got to go now but I’ll get back to you an @elfm on this.
Meanwhile I am thinking about the sort of Drone operations center for which pictures were posted recently and just now again by @Taojas
That’s for operations at Bakmut. Something like that might be useful less camouflaged and concealed but more dispersed, mobile and armoured in an armoured maneuver force.
Asking whether there is room for the hub equipment in heavy tanks communicating with drones and dispersed operators supervising multiple screens with multiple drones in the air from dispersed multiple Armoured Vehicles. Launch and recovery operators and the shorter endurance drones themselves can travel in smaller vehicles and shuttle drones that cannot keep up back and forth when they are used for flank and rear surveillance.
Forward drone recon should have a transportable sized drone feeding back to a robust, but not heavily armoured vehicle. That vehicle has a starlink that sends live data to the command point. The command point can and should be far removed from the battle, outside of any danger of enemy fires. There should be no need for heavily armoured command units. The officers in charge of small units should know their objective. Senior command stay back and monitor.
Multiple drone recon vehicles provide redundancy and flexibility. This is modular, keep bolting on extra drones via starlink as they move forward. Send a recon vehicle to a sector that is blind.
Dig up some stuff about Mission Command. That’s where your organic drone capability is best suited to link in. Closer to the front the recon info can be distributed, the more robust things are if complex comms go down. You may even end up with a frontline unit commander parking himself 1km back with a drone crew and radioing commands direct to the tanks / IFVs from that Humvee.
I’m not 100% on how militaries will use this style of command, but from my experience with fire services, that’s the vibe of how recon info is distributed.
