Khodakovsky claims Ukraine is stepping up efforts in the Vuhledar area, says first Leopards were sighted:
“The situation on Novodonets’ke and to the left towards Velika Novosilka is difficult - the enemy, having felt our weak points, is stepping up his efforts. For the first time we saw leopards in our tactical area. As I expected yesterday - having a sense of success, the enemy will throw additional forces into the battle. Only in the area of Novodonets’ke recorded up to thirty units of armored vehicles.”
Well it was never going to be a rose garden for UKR forces to adapt to this invasion and win. But Kramer and Schneider’s “plan for a plan” is good and sensible imao. … hope it gets implemented before too late.
I’ll pitch an aid package from Australia which I think could have a strategic, if not an immediate tactical impact.
We promise:
59 Abrams tanks delivered 2024-2025
140 M113 AS4 delivered 2024-2025
60 bushmaster delivered 2023-2024
training contingent to deliver 1000 Ukrainian troops every 2 months for the duration of the war
artillery ammunition production for the duration of the war
drone production for the duration of the war
standing offer of 40 Classic Hornets for future aircraft alliance with Finland / Canada.
See a theme?
Russia is hoping to outlast western aid. Locking in a long term significant military aid package breaks the Russian calculus. They cannot wait until 2024 if there’s a mass of Australian tanks due.
This will mesh with substantial packages promised from across the EU to deliver billions over a 5 year period. It locks in aid that will not fade as the west loses interest.
If anything, this type of telegraphed aid package would be easiest for Australia to deliver considering our procurement timeline and would have an outsized impact on the war ending. Timelines are deliberately flexible, but that uncertainty has value.
@wannabe has responded re Hertling and Abrams. I don’t have a list of other instances handy, but formed an opinion that he is “reliably” wrong because of checking his threads on that at the time where he clearly relied on pulling rank and “authority” instead of argument. I consider the propensity of such people to be wrong quite “reliable” - ie you can count on it - not as decisive but as a factor that weighs against whatever they are saying.
No, I was confident that they would not do what General Hertlin said and head for “positions that have been reinforced for 6 months”, but only speculating that they could turn up “Anywhere that they aren’t expected”.
I didn’t mean “anywhere” literally. Going around all the way from Kyiv or Kharkiv to Mariupol would certainly be “unexpected” but that is because it would also be implausibly difficult, for the reasons you mention.
I did spell out a specific possibility, which is NOT the line on your map.
The reason that possibility came to mind was that I was posting immediately after my two preceding comments on current situation re:
I have a prejudice that there would be a limited counter offensive in Bakhmut and the recent news I was commenting on at above link confirms that it is not a place where defensive positions have been reinforced for 6 months but rather a place where the rotation of exhausted Wagner troops and replacement by fresh but inexperienced troops is in progress immediately following culmination of their offensive and without time to prepare defenses.
Ukraine would know whether the reports that Russian MoD was laying minefields behind the withdrawing Wagner forces are true. If so that would indicate they are not confident of holding Bakhmut once armour arrives on the two roads that are now open, given that their flanks were in fact counter encircled as announced by both Ukraine and Prigozhin. If they also confirm that Wagner is indeed removing the minefields that prevent an advance past Bakhmut to the South-East and fighting with the forces supposed to be relieving them, then they may decide to advance past Bakhmut along the path along which their freshly arrived mine clearing equipment would be most effective.
I provided a link to map of Semyhiria where minefields were supposed to prevent a Ukrainian advance past Bakhmut in that direction.
On your map that would be a line starting on one or both sides of Bakhmut, proceeding in the general direction of Rostov-on-Don until about the line between Donetsk and Luhansk before turning south towards Taganarog. I cannot think of any reason why they would turn towards Mariupol like your line when they could cut the entire land bridge from East or West of Taganarog.
Ukraine would know what the defenses are like along that path. My impression is that Russia’s defense lines are inside Ukraine’s Donbas, not in Russia’s border region Rostov. Plus Ukraine has made sure Russia is moving forces to defend its border with Kharkiv, not Rostov.
Seems plausible that Russia would expect a large Ukrainian force there preparing to attack south towards Mariupol, but less plausible that the force would attack Donetsk and be defeated doing so. Again Ukraine would know if there happens to be a large force there and what it’s plans were and whether they included a feint towards Donetsk. Whatever its plans were, recent developments might result in its plans now being to move South-East towards Taganrog and link up with the force moving south towards Taganrog.
I cannot disagree with your opinion of your line on your map
Looking forward to your opinion on the lines I actually had in mind. The supply lines would be those supporting the forces currently counter encircling Bakhmut and those supporting those forces preparing for offensive from Zaporizhia.
They are of course just speculation. But speculation consistent with the fact that Ukraine will keep probing to see what the actual weak spots are and respond to the current situation when convenient.
Also consistent with Ukraine recovering the whole land bridge plus large part of Donetsk region including the city. I don’t think they lack ambition. It is possible that they may now have enough armour.
Admittedly affected by my prejudices that they want the devastating effect on Russian morale from taking Bakhmut and also by my lack of experience in tactical war games and interest in strategic game of Diplomacy where such issues are central. Fighting among enemies who could have supported each other enabling friendly forces that were separated from each other by those enemy forces and so could not otherwise support each other to do so appeals to me in a way that makes that option more salient to me than may be justified.
Ukraine also pushing north and south around Bakhmut. Likely a push to force Russia to more reinforcements away from an intended area of attack. If Russia doesn’t respond, they’ll just keep going.
Magyar fund raising video confirms that they ARE now building 200 “Sorcerer” (winged) relay drones to increase the range of 20,000 “People’s” One Way Attack (“kamikaze”) drones at USD $400 each using F7 frames supporting 1kg payload for 100 military units with 2 winged ISTAR drones each.
Says they have arranged an industrial scale production line not dependent on Chinese suppliers able to deliver repeated runs of 20,000.
Current deliveries of (Ukrainian?) winged drones are 25 per week. 24 crews trained so far at 10 crews per week.
Mentions that they are delivering field tested technology, not doing long term “e-e” project, presumably “electronic engineering”. So I assume it is literally just a relay (“repeater”) to existing ground controller and pilot.
Adding Jetson Orin to the winged drones should be straight forward to combine the winged drone operator with the OWA pilot and relay to remote Drone Operator Coordination Center quite separate from launchers and data links. Perhaps adding a cheap MEMS IMU to the OWA drones. (Chips are about $6 wholesale, $30 retail).
But does require an engineering project that would need central government initiative and resources whereas Magyar project is collecting own funds via crypto etc.
What if the standards Vladimir Putin applies to Ukraine were applied to Russia? Let’s conduct a thought experiment and try to figure out the real causes of the war.
I’m in favour of nailing down such long term commitments. As a step that complements and does not preclude pushing for immediate deliveries (including acceleration of the commitments that were previously postponed to long term).
But I don’t agree with “breaks the Russian calculus”. The regime is stuck with the fact that it ends when it loses the war. They will fight until the regime is ended. They started the war because autocracy in Russia cannot survive democracy in Ukraine. There is no other “calculus”.
General Ben Hodges explained it very clearly on 23 May unpaywalled The Times:
Lieutentant General Ben Hodges said President Biden’s pledge to back Ukraine for “as long as it takes” was “meaningless” as he challenged western leaders to state clearly what they wanted to achieve and then equip President Zelensky’s forces accordingly.
Biden, Rishi Sunak and Olaf Scholz, the German chancellor, needed to say “we want Ukraine to win”, he said, adding: “If they did that, this war would be over by the end of the year.”
Hodges, 65, who is retired, said: “Look how fragile the Russians are. The only chance they have is if we lose the desire to support Ukraine.”
The former top US officer in Europe, now a senior adviser to Human Rights First, said that President Putin had been emboldened to invade Ukraine by the West’s failure to respond to his 2008 invasion of Georgia, his backing the use of chemical weapons in Syria and his seizure of Crimea and Donbas in 2014.
“This is what failed deterrence looks like. Yes, deterrence is expensive but as we’re seeing now failed deterrence is much more expensive,” he said. “We need to spell out the desired strategic outcome. We need to say we want Ukraine to get all its territory back, to rebuild its economy, bring back thousands of Ukrainian children deported to Russia and get accountability for Russian war crimes.
“If we don’t do that, I don’t think the Chinese will be too impressed with anything we say about Taiwan or the South China Sea. And that will be a much more difficult war, given the geography and the distance involved.”
“Committing” to do things you won’t do now at some time later is a LOT less convincing then ACTUALLY doing what one is committed to.
Promises for “as long as it takes” remain meaningless when spelled out in terms of what will be dribbled out over an indefinate period. Other priorities can still prevent fulfilling the promises.
The ONLY benefit is that having got meaningless procrastinators commitments to do specific things “later” (such as your specific list) one can then lever those into “Why not NOW”.
Zelensky veered from expressions of gratitude to Western supporters for weapons deliveries to words of frustration over their reluctance to give Ukraine greater quantities of powerful arms to fend off the Russians.
His statements reflected the balance he must find between pressing to get what he needs to retain Ukraine’s independence and domestic political support while not pushing allies too far and eroding their backing.
Zelensky said he was aware that Western leaders sometimes take offense at his harsh tone, but couldn’t understand why, in his view, they were drip-feeding more-advanced arms that they know would protect lives and help Ukraine win.
If Ukraine isn’t able to withstand Russia, Zelensky said, “that animal, that beast will develop a taste” for conquest and go further.
“Let’s not compare who should be grateful to whom,” he said.
…
Zelensky said he was grateful to Western countries for supplying weapons systems, but that deliveries should be faster and in greater numbers as delays were costing lives.
In particular, he said, Ukraine needs more Patriot missile batteries—which consist of several launchers, a powerful radar, a control station and other support equipment—to protect its cities and front-line troops.
Ukraine now has at least two Patriot batteries, but Zelensky said he would like as many as 50, as it is the only system capable of intercepting some of the advanced missiles fired from Russia.
Dribbling stuff out prolongs the war and costs lives. The world has every reason to be grateful to Ukraine and no reason to do favours to the arms industry who are the only beneficiaries of dragging it out.
It isn’t seizing Kyiv. It isn’t militarily conquering Ukraine. His best hope is wait for Trump to win the next election and then have the US stop all military support. That would shift the balance of power back in his favour.
If that theory of victory is shredded by substantial long term commitments, the logic of dragging out the war disappears. Promising a drip feed of aid doesn’t extend the war, it does the opposite. It means that extending the war is pointless.
Because if waiting for Trump isn’t an option, what else does Putin realistically have?
Assault in the south is by a marine unit armed with French AMX-10 light tanks. No sign of the heavy assault units trained by NATO.
“One reason why Ukraine is likely focusing on the Vuhledar-Velyka Novosilka area is because Russia pulled units from there (e.g. the 200th and 72nd MRB) to reinforce Bakhmut’s flanks, and the 40th and 155th NIB were not properly reconstituted after their failed Feb-March assaults.”
He’s working (most likely closely with China) on activating the far right elements in western democracies. Support for Germany’s far right is as high as it has been in recent history as an example.
Also politically deactivating millennials / gen Zs to prevent voter turn out.
Parts of the Balkans and Eastern Europe are also drifting with the risk of Orban style governments emerging.
It’s a game of geopolitical chicken which is why we need to lock in as much support as possible in the short term. The only certainty in politics is change
Sadly and dangerously I think this is the play. His cyber troopers will go all out to try make this happen. Trump is, as his neice Mary stated so loudly …remains the most dangerous man in the world, notwithstanding Putin’s evil…
