Doesn’t sound like that is directed to “organize a new resistance movement within russia” with all that Ukrainian nationalism
They should direct some propaganda to inspiring the many aggrieved Russian survivors of the war that have returned home to take up arms against their evil overlords
I checked out the website and took it as not only being directed at people in occupied Ukrainian territories but also at the border oblasts of russia where russian citizens who sympathize with Ukraine or people with relatives in the occupied territories can also get in on the action. Perhaps I got it wrong.
I think the SBU and other agencies are already engaged in that.
Bump
Ukraine hit another oil storage depot in the Rostov region. Ummmm… big?
Probably lives in the TV shows thread more.
But for anyone in here who hasn’t caught it before now, I found the Netflix “Turning Point - The bomb and the Cold War” series a good watch. A good quickfire refresher of Soviet history, the nuclear arms race and how we are where we are now with Russia. The story from Stalin to the current mess in Russia and their savage war on Ukraine. Forgot how heady those eastern European days in the late 80s and 90s were pre-Putin sadly.
https://www.netflix.com/gb/title/81614129?s=a&trkid=13747225&trg=cp&vlang=en&clip=81760325
Operation Market Garden was a Bridge Too Far.
The incursion towards Kursk is now a Bridge Too Many for RU.
The daily updates from here are pretty good, covering the battle movement in great detail:
I have always known, that the biggest threat to Putin, is not the west, it’s those that surround him.
As Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine drags on, his grip on power is becoming increasingly precarious. The full-scale invasion, initially intended to project Russian strength and secure Ukraine within Moscow’s sphere of influence, has instead brought economic ruin and military embarrassment. As Ukrainian forces continue to make bold incursions into Russian territory, the ripple effects are being felt within the Kremlin walls, where whispers of discontent grow louder and more dangerous.
Russia’s economy, already weakened by years of sanctions and mismanagement, is now teetering on the brink. The war has drained the nation’s coffers, with billions spent on a military campaign that has yielded little but international condemnation and the erosion of Russia’s global standing. The ruble is in freefall, inflation is soaring, and ordinary Russians are growing increasingly disillusioned as they grapple with shortages and a deteriorating quality of life.
Inside Putin’s inner circle, the mood is even more tense. The Kremlin’s power brokers, once loyal allies who benefited from Putin’s long reign, are now calculating the cost of continued allegiance. As Ukrainian forces demonstrate their ability to strike deep into Russian territory, the perception of Putin’s invincibility is crumbling. The failed mutiny by the Wagner Group led by Yevgeny Prigozhin in June 2023 was a stark reminder that even those closest to Putin are willing to challenge him when they perceive weakness.
Now, with Ukrainian incursions causing panic and humiliation within Russia, the risk to Putin’s life is growing. The powerful figures around him, from military generals to oligarchs who have seen their fortunes wane, are increasingly viewing him as a liability. They are acutely aware that their own survival may depend on drastic measures, potentially including the removal of the very man they once revered.
Behind closed doors, these elites are weighing their options. Some might seek to isolate Putin politically, stripping him of power while keeping him as a figurehead. Others, more desperate or radical, may consider a more permanent solution. Assassination, once unthinkable, is now a topic of hushed conversations in the dark corners of the Kremlin.
The incursions into Russian territory by Ukrainian forces serve as both a literal and symbolic breach of the security that Putin has promised his people and his elite. The more these attacks penetrate Russian soil, the more they undermine the narrative of Russian strength and Putin’s personal authority. With each Ukrainian advance, the paranoia within the Kremlin intensifies, as does the likelihood that someone close to Putin may decide that his time has come.
The fate of Putin hangs in a delicate balance, with his own inner circle possibly becoming the greatest threat to his life. In a country where power is the ultimate currency, and survival often depends on ruthless pragmatism, the once unassailable leader now finds himself in an increasingly dangerous position, surrounded by those who might see his downfall as their only chance at salvation.
Bump if needed Baz
Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Michal Wyrebkowski, Anders Aslund, Tymofiy Mylovanov
Tue, 20 August 2024 at 4:35 am AEST·13-min read
Getty Images
Even as Ukrainian advances in the Kursk region pierce Russia’s aura of military invincibility, resurgent cynics have painted an unrealistically optimistic picture of a supposedly resilient Russian economy despite sanctions and the exit of over 1,000 global multinational corporations.
This misleading narrative attributes Russia’s apparent economic continuity to aggressive government spending and efforts to shield the population from restrictive monetary policies through extreme fiscal stimulus. However, this rosy outlook is fundamentally flawed, except for one crucial observation: Russia is indeed engaged in unsustainable spending practices.
The reality of Russia’s economic situation is far more complex and concerning than some would have you believe. The productive core of the Russian economy has been severely compromised, with the government’s spending spree bearing a striking resemblance to Keynes’ famous metaphor of digging trenches and filling them with dirt—a superficial attempt to prop up GDP figures without creating genuine economic value, improving the lives of the Russian people, or improving Russian productivity. Financial, production, and human resources have been redirected en masse to the defense sector, leaving the civilian sector struggling to meet growing consumer demand. This imbalance—cannibalizing the rest of the Russian economy to fund Putin’s war—has fueled inflation, further exacerbated by the depreciation of the ruble and rising import costs.
Simply put, Putin’s administration has prioritized military production over all else in the economy, at substantial cost. While the defense industry expands, Russian consumers are increasingly burdened with debt, potentially setting the stage for a looming crisis. The excessive focus on military spending is crowding out productive investments in other sectors of the economy, stifling long-term growth prospects and innovation.
It’s crucial to approach Russian economic data with skepticism. As we’ve repeatedly highlighted, the country’s statistical services have a documented history of distorting economic indicators, making it challenging to accurately assess the true state of the economy. In light of these factors, the apparent resilience of the Russian economy is more illusion than reality, especially on the following key fronts.
Despite increases in Russian budget revenues, mostly the result of a devalued ruble, continuously growing inflation (hence growing revenues from sales tax), and new levies and taxes all over the economy: a rise in the excise duty on cigarettes and cars, a windfall tax on the metallurgical and fertilizer sector, a tax on the sale of Russian assets by Western companies, and many more—the Russian budget still finds itself running a 2% deficit of GDP, which is significant by Russian standards. Russia is fast running through the reserves that it accumulated over the 2000s and 2010s—or at least the half that is not frozen in the West and being repurposed to help Ukraine by the G7 governments. Today, the total distributable liquid assets remaining in Russia are just short of $100 billion. Putin’s cronies point to sizable yuan-denominated holdings stored with the Chinese Central Bank, ignoring the unenviable reality that this means China holds disproportionate sway over the future of Russian finances.
The biggest revenue item for Russia has always been oil and gas sector proceeds, which constitute one-third of the total budget revenues. The only reason why we see these revenues growing (still below expectations) is due to significantly higher taxes imposed on oil and gas producers, which cannibalizes their productive assets and impedes their ability to reinvest in future production, mortgaging the future to pay for Putin’s war today.
Russia has implemented a mineral extraction tax on its oil and gas giants and increased the corporate tax rate for Novatek, its only LNG producer, from 20% to 34%, while increasing the overall corporate tax rate by 25% across the board effective January 2025. Measures like these, paired with Western sanctions and the voluntary withdrawal of global multinational businesses, stifle investment critical to the future of the Russian economy. Moreover, key development projects such as Arctic LNG-2 have been brought to a halt due to the exit of companies like Linde, Baker Hughes, and Technip, along with sweeping U.S. sanctions.
Over the past months, Russian crude has been trading at an average $10 discount compared to benchmark Brent oil prices, and natural gas prices returned largely to depressed pre-war levels, as we clearly see reflected in the poor economic performance of the Russian state giants. Gazprom’s net loss amounted to 480.6 billion rubles for the period from January to June 2024, compared to a net loss of 255 billion rubles in the same period last year—a record for poor performance. Additionally, the net sales of foreign currencies by the largest exporters fell to $11.5 billion in July from $14.5 billion in June.
The only reason why the budget revenues continue to increase is because of harmful inflation and the overall labor shortage in Russia—partially thanks to the exodus of millions of educated Russian workers following Putin’s invasion—which translates to insatiable wage pressure and spikes in the prices of manufactured goods. Russia is bleeding dry its private sector, which has a hard time competing against the defense sector wages. None of that is sustainable in the longer term. The Russian budget is effectively an act of desperation in wartime. Putin is throwing everything into the fireplace—and it’s completely unsustainable.
The Kremlin’s approach to social welfare and resource allocation during wartime reveals a stark contrast between military spending and civilian welfare. While the government has poured an estimated 2.75 to 3 trillion rubles (equivalent to 1.4-1.6% of Russia’s expected GDP in 2024) into payments for soldiers, the wounded, and families of the deceased, the civilian population faces a different reality. These military payments, amounting to 3.4-3.7% of all consumer spending by Russians in 2023, have further increased inflationary pressures. However, Russia’s war Keynesianism masks the true wretched state of welfare for the broader population. Announced increases in pensions and public sector salaries often fail to materialize, with public sector salary increases implemented in merely 13% of Russian regions, despite Putin’s decrees—exposing a huge gap between propaganda and reality.
The methodology for calculating these salaries is manipulated through procedural tricks, such as reducing employee numbers through sleight of hand. Consequently, 60% of Russian physicians report that their salaries are insufficient to meet basic needs, with 80% working multiple jobs to make ends meet. Meanwhile, Russia has experienced a massive brain drain, losing over a million highly educated individuals, 86% of whom are under the age of 45 and 80% college degree holders, according to a French Institute of International Relations report.
Notwithstanding the political repressions imposed by the Kremlin, there is a strong economic rationale for this dramatic talent flight. IT workers’ salaries in Russia have decreased by 15-25% in 2024, down to 150,000 rubles, driven in part by the exodus of global multinational companies from the country.
The redistribution of welfare is clearly targeted, prioritizing military expenditures over civilian needs and effectively shifting the economic burden of the war onto the broader Russian population while creating an illusion of economic stability through military spending for a tiny subsection of beneficiaries.
The inflationary pressures on the Russian economy remain high, despite the Russian Central Bank setting an interest rate of 18%. An annualized rate of price increases from May to July stands at 10%, driven significantly by war spending. This economic militarization is accelerating inflation in a fundamental way: increased production of military goods boosts employment and wages, but the resulting surge in demand isn’t matched by a corresponding increase in consumer goods production. Normally, such an imbalance would be offset by increased imports. Under current conditions, this correction isn’t occurring. In fact, according to the Russian Central Bank’s preliminary estimate, imports in May 2024 were 10% lower than in May 2023, exacerbating the supply-demand mismatch.
The business environment is rapidly deteriorating, with the Russian Central Bank’s assessment showing an almost crisis-like 4.75-point monthly decline. Labor shortages are driving unsustainable wage growth, especially in the military-industrial complex, creating an inflationary wage spiral. While seemingly positive for workers, wage growth is outpacing the minimal productivity gains in Russia while fueling further inflation, which is borne by those very workers as they live their everyday lives. Russian businesses, having levered up in expectation of rate cuts, now face a harsh reality in an increasingly closed economy where such cuts are unlikely. The increase in output is not structural but driven by idiosyncrasies such as the completion of large metalworking orders, predominantly concentrated in the state-controlled armaments industry. All these factors combine to create a self-reinforcing cycle of inflation and economic instability, pointing towards an impending downturn and threatening to destabilize the entire economic structure.
The notion that increased interest rates will attract Indian and Chinese investors to Russia is also fundamentally flawed. In reality, Russian treasuries have become toxic assets, and the country teeters on the brink of financial insolvency. The country has become completely cut off from global financial markets and pools of capital. Simply put, no investor from anywhere in the world wants to purchase Russian securities. The only buyers of Russian sovereign bonds at scale are Russian financial institutions, making it impossible for Russia to finance its large deficits. Furthermore, it has become impossible for Russian companies to tap into global debt or equity markets to raise desperately needed funds. The idea that ruble-yuan transactions could form the foundation of a new, non-dollar financial world order, as many Putin cronies optimistically predict, is laughable, with a vast majority of global trade transacted in the dollar.
Moreover, China is not helping Russia financially, contrary to popular belief and no matter whatever political rhetoric the two countries may engage in. The stark disparity in interest rates between Russia and China illustrates the misalignment of their economies. While the interest rate on overnight yuan transactions in Russia hovers near 20%, Chinese banks lend to each other at rates closer to 2%. This gulf in lending rates represents a fundamental disconnect between the two economies. Furthermore, the fact that 80% of Russia’s yuan transactions are being reversed due to fears of secondary sanctions from Chinese financial institutions underscores the reluctance of these institutions to engage with Russia. Even direct commodity payments, traditionally a staple of Russian-Chinese trade, are being frozen, according to Bloomberg reports. This paints a clear picture: Chinese financial institutions are unwilling to lend to Russia, effectively isolating it from a key potential ally, out of their own pragmatic financial self-interest, regardless of the rhetoric of political leaders.
Similarly, the hope of Putin’s cronies that investors from India and China would seamlessly replace Western oil and gas companies in Russia has also proven to be unrealistic. Indian investment in Russia has stagnated and totaled a mere $14 bln by the end of 2023, close to pre-war levels, while the overall value of greenfield foreign direct investments from all countries decreased from $14.9 bln in 2021 to a meager $300 million in 2022.
The current climate of fear surrounding secondary sanctions and stringent wartime regulations has deterred significant investment out of pure financial self-interest. Even Chinese companies that had previously shown interest, such as Sinopec, have suspended operations and investment talks in Russia.
The forced pivot to Chinese technology has also proven costly for Russia. Novatek, for instance, reported a staggering $4 billion increase in capital expenditures for its Arctic LNG-2 project, attributed to the necessity of replacing Western equipment with Chinese alternatives.
It appears that China, India, and other Global South nations are more interested in buying discounted Russian energy than in making substantial investments in the country’s economy. Russians themselves were not capable of filling the economic niches left by the 1,000 multinationals with combined assets of over $220 billion that curtailed their operations in Russia.
For all the government spending, the rest of the economy is stagnant. The contribution of import substitution schemes to economic growth remains modest at best. Every Russian company that has tried to step into the vacated footsteps of Western predecessors still lacks crucial know-how and access to capital, being completely cut off from global capital markets. And Western pundits don’t understand that oil is now being sold at breakeven prices given Russia’s highly inefficient production costs and high transportation costs to its now-more-distant customers while natural gas remains virtually unsold.
The financial strain is not limited to cross-border trade and investment—it’s increasingly evident in the domestic credit market as well. Russians are facing growing difficulties in obtaining personal loans, a trend that signals deepening economic troubles at the household level. In July, the approval rate for unsecured consumer loan applications plummeted to a year-to-date low of 36%, down from 41% in June. This means that nearly two-thirds of Russians seeking cash loans are being turned away empty-handed, a stark indication of the tightening lending policies of Russian banks.
In conclusion, the apparent resilience of the Russian economy is largely illusory, built on a precarious foundation of unsustainable government spending and short-term market factors. The recent ostensible growth spurt masks deep-seated structural weaknesses. As unsustainable stimulus inevitably fades, Russia faces an unenviable perfect storm of challenges: the exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves, an irreversibly strained labor market, rising inflation outside the control of the central bank, and the heavy burden of military expenditures for years to come.
The government’s approach has redirected resources away from productive sectors, cannibalizing the rest of the Russian economy to fund Putin’s war and stifling long-term growth prospects and innovation. With the economy having absorbed the wartime stimulus through credit expansion and increased investment into the defense industry, it now stands at a precipice. A significant economic slowdown or recession appears not just possible but increasingly probable.
Russia is set on a long-term trajectory of structural challenges under the weight of sanctions and elevated government spending—and the true cost of its economic policies is becoming ever more apparent. A looming economic catastrophe driven by the fundamental flaws in Russia’s current strategy will likely set the stage for severe long-term consequences that will play out in the years ahead.
RE: China’s self-interest trumps everything else.
This part of that Fortune article bears highlighting. If the Master Strategist put all his bets on the land grab of Ukraine thinking that the Chinese would be bankrolling him when he burned his reserves (which I have no doubt was given as a tacit assurance before he launched his adventure) then he drastically under-estimated their own pragmatic financial self-interest.
Obviously this is also why, geopolitically, China will never have any true allies nor true enemies in the world, temporaneously or perpetually.
