I don’t want to curb enthusiasm but maybe temper expectations.
Yes, they are great, but there’s only a few of them. Some targets, like the Kerch bridge, will require many of them. So, they’ll use them judiciously, well planned and coordinated attacks.
Hopefully a very well dug in forward observation team if the video above your post was was what they were calling in.
Another point that Arty Green made was that some officers were failing to use adequate artillery suppression before sending infantry to close combat. Said that cannot be due to shortage of ammunition. (I assume that means you would instead retreat if you did not have enough ammunition to suppress the enemy before close combat).
Looks like they are not making that mistake (and not short of ammunition).
I’m still being premature about a counter offensive to relieve siege of Bakhmut having been launched.
But I’ll certainly admit to being surprised if the movements around Bakhmut can still be regarded as close to a “rounding error” for long.
The way I see it, this currently isn’t about posing a dilemma as to whether enemy troops should reinforce Melitopol or Bakhmut. It is about resolving the siege of Bakhmut.
A dilemma was posed for Ukraine - whether to withdraw from Bakhmut or risk encirclement by reinforcing to hold.
Ukraine made its choice - at a strategic, not tactical level, by a stavka decision announced as made jointly by President as Supreme Commander, CinC and Cdr Eastern Group. They committed reinforcements to relieve Bakhmut that were being held in reserve for use elsewhere.
The enemy also made its choice and committed to take Bakhmut (by May 9).
The enemy’s forces are now exhausted, demoralized, depleted and fighting each other over who is to blame. If there is some “weak point” that anyone is probing and niggling to find, they have found one - Bakhmut.
The reinforcements that were sent to relieve Bakhmut are now carrying out that operation at the point where the enemy is about as overextended and demoralized as an enemy could plausibly get.
I don’t think that poses much of a dilemma for the enemy forces. They can retreat or they can die.
It appears that they are retreating.
It does not follow that relieving the siege of Bakhmut will be followed by pursuit much deeper into the Donbas. It might or that could come much later. But it looks like the siege of Bakhmut will be ended with the result:
Bakhmut Held!!!
Meanwhile if there are more attractive weak points in the land bridge both the reinforcements sent recently and much of the force that was originally committed to holding Bakhmut could be rotated out and end up joining the fight elsewhere. A much smaller force could continue to hold Bakhmut with artillery cover from the heights when the enemy that was flanking it and advanced into most of the city has withdrawn.
Later, an offensive deeper into the Donbas could be launched across the canal either at Bakhmut or several other places where Ukraine prepared the battlespace by denying the enemy its best natural defensive line by having artillery on both sides of it.
Until then attention could return to the land bridge.
That may not be what happens. But if it is, that is what I would call a successful counter offensive at Bakhmut.
BTW, as @bigallan points out that does not appear to be the way translators are reporting Zelensky’s use of the term.
In a quick look through the speeches at official Presidential site I have not yet found examples of official translations either way:
The European Broadcasting Union refused a request from Zelensky, supported by the UK and others, to deliver an address at the Eurovision Song Contest. The EBU explained that the Eurovision Charter precluded any political statements.
Instead, the BBC ( which is standing in as Eurovision host for Ukraine as last year’s winner):did a short interview with Zelensky.
The guy saying weapons won’t decide this is dumb. Weapons have already made a massive contribution - Ukraine has exploited their limited asymmetry much better than russia
On 15 May, Li Hui, the special representative for Eurasian Affairs will be visiting Ukraine, Poland, France, Germany and Russia, ‘ … for communication on seeking a political settlement of the Ukraine crisis’
Girkin and his “Angry Patriots Club” comrades are clearly preparing for the worst, perhaps ready to take power in Russia:
“When it comes to taking part in politics, today we say that the Club is just a collection point for people like that… but in case of worsening of the situation, we’re ready to politicise our potential and act in the framework of a social-political organisation” - says Pavel Gubarev, a prominent Novorossiya terrorist, during a “press-conference” of the Club on 12 May.
This organisation, launched just under two months ago, currently has around 25 members among the more radical Russian activists, including Girkin, Pavel Gubarev, Yuriy Yevych, Vladimir Grubnik, Maksim Kalashnikov, and other individuals known for criticising the actions of Russian authorities in this war. They say they are a mixed bag: national-bolsheviks, national-democrats, communists, and monarchists, but any differences between them are forgotten in favour of one goal - “to win the war”.
“[We are] participants of the SMO, non-systemic politicians, and people who have been criticising the authorities for 20 years and saying it’s going the wrong direction”, says Gubarev about current members of the Club.
We’ve seen Girkin doing regular lonely livestreams in the past 15 months, but now, he is ready to act: “…after a series of non-critical defeats, the Russian army is unable to win the war in its current state […] measures to improve the situation have not been implemented, are not being implemented, and there are no plans to implement them”.
As Russia’s position in the battlefield deteriorates and Putin’s power, despite appearing solid, could be undermined in case of successful Ukrainian counter-offensives, Girkin and his comrades could be preparing to take power if things go really sour in Russia.
For now, Girkin seems less inclined to openly express these desires, saying he would still like the “angry patriots” to assist authorities any way they can. Yet, hints of him joining politics have been voiced on numerous occasions in recent months.
Regardless of their intentions, none of the Club members appear to see a positive outcome for Russian army in the current circumstances: “We came to the line, beyond which there is a feeling of abyss”, as Gubarev puts it.
This will indeed be an interesting development to follow in the coming months.