This is a development that the RU leaders will not have been expecting.
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So who poisoned Lucka?
Could see both sides benefiting with him out of the picture, or replaced with someone aligned to their cause.
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On the other hand, there have been pictures circulating of him in Belarus, one describing him with a heavily bandaged hand (but which looked more like an antiseptic dressing.
Todayâs Katz still does not have proper English subtitles 17 hours after release. Thatâs a relief as I did watch with auto-translation of Russian auto-transcription would have felt obliged to respond to its regurgitated conventional wisdom about Iraq war.
On March 20, 2003, the US invaded Iraq. What really happened there? How did the American special operation go and how did it end? And most importantly, what is happening in Iraq 20 years after the invasion? Letâs figure it out today.
You been waiting how many years to post that??
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No one poisoned him, it was a bad dietary choice. Lucky he never ate at the tenth floor restaurant.
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If Lukashenko was to die, I thought he was angling for his son to takeover? By the article posted, they want to hold elections? Canât see this going well for the Russia backed proxiesâŚ
âElectionsâ
You know the sort, the ones with predetermined results.
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Gotchya
From Perun video.
2022 10 million artillery rounds fired by Russia.
2023 7 million artillery rounds predicted.
Mix changing from high end missiles and 152mm artillery to tank and mortar rounds.
Russian targeting and responsiveness is improving.
Heavily impacted by arrival of HIMARS and exhausting of Russian stockpiles.
GLMRS production now 12,000 missiles per annum. Russian equivalent systems likely a small fraction of that production, without the pre-war stockpiles.
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Ok, I would prefer to spell out what the international community should conclude about how to control Russian nukes but it is perhaps tactically wise, at least for a Ukrainian official, to merely submit the issue to an international conference.
Not being a Ukrainian official, and perhaps not being tactically wise, I would add the conclusion.
- The international converence convened to consider how to deal with the threat to world peace flowing from the possession of nuclear weapons by the Russian fascist regime should resolve:
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Immediately following the expulsion of the Russian fascist regimeâs from the former U.S.S.R.'s seat on the Security Council a resolution shall be placed before the Security Council to carry out its responsibilities for mobilizing the armed forces of all member states of the United Nations to safeguard world peace from aggressor states by establishing the Military Staff Committee provided for under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
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In the event of any permanent member of the Security Council vetoing such action those members of the Security Council willing to carry out their responsibilities for world peace shall forthwith constitute themselves as an Interim Emergency Security Council to exercise the powers set out in Chapter VII without further delay, on the authority of the decision of this conference and the authority of those member States of the United Nations that carry out their responsibilities to provide armed forces under Articles 43 to 45 placed at the disposal of the Security Council under the strategic direction of the Military Staff Committee under Article 47.
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The Interim Emergency Security Council shall cease to operate when new arrangements for international security have been made following:
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The unconditional surrender of the fascist authorities in Russia
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The establishment of democratically elected governments of those territories willing to comply with the charter of the United Nations formerly under the control of those fascist authorities.
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The securing of all nuclear weapons and related material and installations previously controlled by the fascist authorities of Russia by armed forces under the strategic direction of the Military Staff Committee.
A fourth indispensable element is missing - collective defence:
A final part of strategic context is the important question âwhat comes next?â While Ukraine is capable of making significant inroads into recapturing its territory and destroying Russian military capability in the months ahead, it is unlikely that a single offensive will lead to the complete defeat of Russia in Ukraine (however, I really want to be proved wrong about this).
Given the size and relative wealth of Russia, it will probably require multiple offensive campaigns by Ukraine, in 2023 and beyond, to secure Russiaâs defeat. This will demand strategic patience and ongoing support from the West. Therefore, an important part of the strategic context for the coming offensives should be an understanding of the position Ukraine might be in (militarily, politically) at the end of the offensives and what the opportunities and threats of situation that might be.
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Given the magnitude of the operations about to unfold in Ukraine, and their importance beyond Ukraineâs borders, we might reach back into history for words that might provide comfort to families and friends of those about to go into battle, while inspiring those who will fight, sacrifice and deliver Ukraine from its Russian invaders.
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The eyes of the world are indeed upon Ukraine in their great and noble undertaking to defeat the Russians.
I have omitted a cringeworthy reference to speeches made when Western allies eventually opened a second front. Mike Ryanâs recent pointed remarks about Australia being a âstrategic bystanderâ have been far better than most in demanding greater concrete support for Ukraine instead of preening and posturing about the worldâs solidarity while Ukraine does all the fighting and dying.
I agree with Ryan that " it will probably require multiple offensive campaigns by Ukraine, in 2023 and beyond, to secure Russiaâs defeat". But that means Ukraine could need much more than âstrategic patience and ongoing support from the Westâ.
There is no second front. Nor has discussion even started about âWhat comes nextâ. Instead Ryan just says:
Therefore, an important part of the strategic context for the coming offensives should be an understanding of the position Ukraine might be in (militarily, politically) at the end of the offensives and what the opportunities and threats of situation that might be.
We wonât know what position might be in next year until then. But serious âunderstanding of the position Ukraine might be in (militarily, politically) at the end of the offensives and what the opportunities and threats of situation that might beâ requires analysis now that is simply missing.
Suppose for example that Ukraineâs offensives are highly successful. How might Russia respond? How might China respond?
Surrender or collapse would be nice, in which case there is no need for further analysis. But replacement of the incompetent fascist regime by one better able to suppress opposition and mobilize another million troops might be the alternative scenario to prepare for.
Chinese fascists might decide that it would be unwise to back a loser. But they might take the view that prolonging the war at the expense of Russians and Ukrainians is just as much in their interests as it is in the interests of the US arms industry. Simply supplying âdual useâ tools and equipment for munitions production at a fair market price could ensure that Russia does not run out of ammunition or barrels.
An article about what Ukraine might do without even considering what the enemy might do sums up the actual state of Australian strategic thinking.
Australia has a bigger stake in this than most European countries. Unless the rest of the world gets its act together to ensure a rapid end to the war by ending the fascist regime that started it, the much stronger fascist power in our region is not going to be deterred from starting a much bigger war with much better prospects of success than Russia ever had and very little reason to suppose that anybody would challenge it.
The concept of collective defence needs to be brought into mainstream analysis - NOW.
Google imagery of Chernobaivka airport has updated, the site of 197 himars strikes.
Impressive amount of kit.
I donât understand the image. Cannot see indicators of sites of 197 himars strikes, or whatever is impressive about update.
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The massive amount of gear the Russians bought in, the rabbit warren of defensive fortifications. Itâs why Ukraine was dropping explosives on the base every second day for months on end.
Itâs interesting to see the messy cobbled together nature of the Russian war machine.
Iâm just seeing an ordinary looking street map. Is there something I should click to see massive amount of gear, rabbit warren etc?
L8R gone gone