Any link with details? It looks like an ad for anti-drone “guns” that have successfully given a fixed wing drone a command to land intact. I am sceptical that either side is flying fixed wing drones that don’t have sufficient encryption to avoid that. Am only familiar with supplies of rotary wing consumer drones eg from China DJI that have only civilian WiFi. Who supplies civilian fixed wing drones with unencrypted WiFi to Russia?
Direct link please. Search for “Dan Rice” at Ukrinform does not index beyond 22 October and shows several stories describing him as a special advisor to CinC Zaluzhnyi, NOT “UA Defence Minster”.
That latest link, dated 19 October is quoting from CNN.
I cannot see any such story on front page or under latest news.
“As the Black Sea is closed to warships except for those at their home ports, there is currently no scope to add to UA naval capacity.” I am curious as to whether you are just repeating yourself or just repeating somebody else saying it.
1 Like
Agree with the rest, but there is a mitigating factor that reduces the relative cost of war related sudden expansion of military production.
Typically military production lines are geared for LRIP so costs per unit, including fixed overhead for RDT&E are very high:
Marginal costs per unit for ramped up production are a lot less than similar sudden ramp up of volume for mass produced civilian items.
2 Likes
5 Likes
“9. At the risk of surrendering the city, evacuate the remains of Prince Grigory Potemkin-Tavrichesky, as they can be defiled by the enemy.”
… so that Tsar Putin can be buried with his heroes:
1 Like
The US is still pumping the money. What’s $50 billion anyway? I suppose it is considered chump change to an economy of GDP $22996.10 billion (1) (Don’t mention the Debt though)
Inside the U.S. Effort to Arm Ukraine | The New Yorker
The Rice article has been taken off the Ukrinform site. It was posted this afternoon Victorian time.
He has done several interviews with CNN.
1 Like
My eyes tend to glaze over at detailed analysis of current tactical situations, let alone convoluted multiple option sequences of future predictions.
But there is one point that resonates with me and I have not seen mentioned elsewhere.
He starts off with:
The current Ukrainian advances will be the ones to push Russian ground forces completely out of Ukraine, leaving any remaining combat to take place on or just over the border with Russia or with longer-range systems, ending major ground combat operations on Ukrainian soil
(emphasis added), repeatedly stresses more limited “end of major combat operations on Ukrainian soil” despite sharing my overall optimism that subsequently Ukraine is bound to win and Ruscist regime to cease to exist. He includes this detailed description of a “frozen” gap between pushing Ruscists out of Ukraine and end of the regime:
Denouement: The Light at the End of the Tunnel and Driving the Russians into Russia
Once Ukrainian forces reach the border, they can drive Russian forces further away with their precision longer-range weapons, even taking out air defenses so that Ukraine’s air force can help enforce the de facto no-man’s-land that is sure to emerge on the Russian side of the border. That no-man’s-land extending miles into Russia is simply going to be the natural outcome: Ukraine can stop its advance on Russia’s border, dig in, and the aforementioned weapons systems can kill and destroy any Russians that get too close, which will force them back, and, additionally, those weapons can destroy ammunition depots, command centers, etc. as they did in Ukraine to make at least the first few dozen miles into Russia unsafe and unusable for Russians…
That does strike me as a “natural” outcome, though it could take the form of an enforced demilitarized zone rather than “no man’s land” - with a functioning Russian civil admistration within a “no fly, no drive” zone excluding Ruscist armed forces - perhaps a Russian administration opposed to the central regime.
Whether any formal peace or cease-fire emerges is harder to tell, but those would be doubtful if somehow Putin manages to stay in power (but, for reasons I discussed in my last piece, it is hard to see how that will happen). We may for some time—years, even—end up with a Korean-like DMZ, the conflict frozen in time.
…Two x-factors, the first far, far more likely than the other: if Putin is overthrown, there could a negotiated, peaceful withdrawal of Russian forces (not along Elon Musk’s absurd lines; and I am convinced that when Putin is gone, Russians will be exhausted and will just want to be done with this war), or it could be because the Russian army or parts of it had mutinied and marched on Moscow to overthrow Putin amidst massive unrest in Russia. And frankly, as things keep getting worse for Putin, Putin should be overthrown, one way or another. It may be in the form of an announcement that Comrade Putin has died peacefully in his sleep as internal Kremlin dynamics remove him the way the ancient Roman Praetorian Guards would remove a mad emperor; it may be massive unrest in the streets and a storming of the Kremlin; it may be a brief civil war or military or security service revolt; whatever way it transpires, Russia cannot long endure Putin, as his staying in power will see its army and maybe even its state disintegrate. Whether all this happens during what I described or after Ukraine secures its eastern border and/or takes Crimea is hard to predict and depends on how long all that takes…
…What remains to be seen are how long this takes, when these different events happen relative to each other, and how many people have to die, how much destruction occurs between now and the end. …
I think details and timing of both war endings and internal upheavals are essentially unpredictable even when the long term outcome is clear as it was in WW2 and Vietnam and is in Ukraine.
Some people just want Russia weakened and/or Putin gone. I want democratic revolution in Russia (and elsewhere). Those are radically different outcomes which most analysts don’t distinguish.
I may overestimate the likelihood of democratic revolution in Russia or the importance of that outcome to Ukraine’s leadership as the only way to avoid another war. But it does strike me as both achievable and uncertain, with a potentially long interval in which Ukraine’s armed forces at Ukraine’s borders are facing a Ruscist regime still fighting for survival across an enforced demilitarized zone.
[Full disclosure] it has not escaped my attention that such a situation requires preparation for continuous surveillance of a 2.5km border with Russia and Belarus to a significant depth by a “Drone Army”. I may be inclined to emphasize the possibility of that being prolonged more than is warranted because of my focus on “Drone Force Project”. But I certainly take comfort from the fact that it is at least being mentioned as a possibility by someone else.
3 Likes
2 Likes
I think this will be the natural outcome and have for some time. That’s why I thought it illogical to attach caveats to the use of US weapons on strikes onto russian territory. When the AFU drive russia back over the border it wouldn’t make sense to cease fire, halt and dig-in and then be at the mercy of air strikes, artillery, rocket and mortar fire coming from russian territory. Being prudent and smart, they will enforce a DMZ as far back into russia as their maximum artillery/HIMARS range allows. I think Putin knows this too and is getting ready for it. That is why, on the 19th of October, Putin not only declared martial law in the annexed regions of Ukraine, he declared every oblast of Russian that borders Ukraine as a “special response regime” - one step below martial law and which allows for the restriction of people’s movements.
The published Kremlin decree ordered an “economic mobilisation” in eight regions adjoining Ukraine, including Crimea, which Russia invaded and annexed in 2014.
It placed them in a special regime one step below martial law and allowed for the restriction of people’s movements.
Putin conferred additional powers on the leaders of all Russia’s 80-plus regions to protect critical facilities, maintain public order and increase production in support of the war effort.
But it was far from clear how fast or how effectively the new measures might bolster Russia’s military position on the ground.
Russia expert Mark Galeotti said on Twitter the moves amounted to “a declaration of variegated martial law across the whole of Russia”, with some level of emergency regulation now applying across the whole country.
He said it was unclear whether regional officials would use the extra powers as Moscow wanted, ignore them, or exploit them as opportunities to embezzle state resources.
4 Likes
“Lada drag race”
That was dark.
1 Like
Right … and yes agree, why is that sounding so like a bit of good old fashioned Russian false flag work?
I’m v concerned about Kherson and UA once the evacuation by Russia is deemed complete. This bollocks from Shoigu is a worry coming from his level in the Kremlin. A forewarning of tactical amd indiscriminate nuclear strikes? Putin is desperate. Some more in the know fear as much
3 Likes
The thread by Galleotti is interesting:
It does not suggest preparations for Ukraine forces arriving at the border, though it is clear that regions closer to the front line have priority.
Does say:
Of course, quite what this means remains to be seen. It is framed as empowering local officials, and it will be interesting to see who uses them as Moscow wants, who essentially tries to ignore them, and who just uses it to embezzle all the more assiduously. 7/
…
This is all a big deal. I am minded of the spread of creeping martial law by extraordinary measures under late tsarism, such that by 1917 most of the country was ‘extraordinary.’ Not a great precedent. 10/END
It is certainly a VERY big deal. My guess is it is just the initial steps in rolling out a fully fascist regime ruling by open terror - which of course will also require replacing unreliable local officials.
If Ukraine can establish “no fly, no drive” zones excluding Ruscist armed forces from hundreds of km of those border regions it could be of great assistance to revolution in Russia - both by humiliating the regime and by enabling material assistance to fighters against it across the border.
In some areas it could be in cooperation with friendly local authorities (eg democratic government in Belarus and any other areas close to Ukraine where Ruscists unable to rule without armed support).
In others it could be quasi occupation eg with civilian vehicles only allowed to move subject to random inspection at Ukrainian checkpoints enforced by drones offering the option of inspection or vehicle destruction. Checkpoints could also be remotely operated cameras.
1 Like
I watched Perun - “Deadly Skies” Air Defence In Ukraine - Drones, SAMs, and Attrition as recommended by @Benny40
It was well worth the time although I may not have time to write up notes on air defence generally (and am still too ignorant about radar) there is one point I hope to comment on soon:
@56:49
I think there’s also reason to suspect that people will be looking at the successes and failures of Russian electronic warfare in some detail observers will want to have an understanding of why Russian electronic warfare may have worked early on to a much greater extent than it’s working now.
There will also I think be a desire to see whether or not the failure of Russian systems to engage targets like HIMARS rockets represents a software rather than a technical failing and if it does ,how rugged are the processors to enable militaries to roll out rapid software updates in an emergency if an enemy comes up with a new target type and you need to reprogram your systems to properly identify categorize and assist the operator in engaging it how quickly can you develop and roll out those upgrades.
The bloke at the front is probably not going to be thrilled if you tell him it’s an 18-month development cycle he’s after a day one patch not three years in Early Access.
I’m very interested in that software update tempo. A major aspect of “Drone Force” proposals would be ability to continuously upgrade the target acquisition capabilities exactly as mentioned by Perun and the use of standardized C2SIM or similar command language that can be replayed from logs to simulate performance and develop improvements.
The notorious delays in military procurement systems seem to me the biggest potential obstacle to what I have in mind.
A classic recent example from 2020 is here:
F-16 Operational Flight Program (OFP) M-series 7.2+ was released in April 2020 to more than 600 Block 40/42/50/52 F-16s delivering a wide range of new capabilities to the Fighting Falcon.
The $455 million program fielded major capability upgrades such as the Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Radar (NORTHCOM’s #1 priority Joint Urgent Operational Need), integration with the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range as well as the latest Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, an Integrated Communication Suite, and 42 other modernization enhancements. Altogether, the upgrades bring reduced pilot workload, enhanced close air support weapons accuracy, increased lethality, and improved projected mission effectiveness rates, according to Capt. Justin R. Marsh, F-16 OFP Lead Engineer.
The F-16 System Program Office (SPO), located at both Hill AFB, Utah and Wright-Patterson AFB is responsible for development and sustainment of capabilities throughout the lifecycle of the aircraft. The F-16 SPO, the 309th Software Engineering Group (SWEG), the OFP Combined Test Force (CTF) including the Air Force Test Center Developmental Test, 53 Wing Operational Test, and the Air National Guard Air Force Reserve Test Center are partnered to develop and field software capability upgrades.
OFP M7.2+ development encompassed over 300 personnel at 7 locations. The 100% organic, in-house development met all requirements while also increasing the reliability of the F-16s Modular Mission Computer. In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, the logisticians at Hill AFB were able to safely overcome restrictions through the combined use of remote telework, plus mission essential use of base facilities and were able to complete all documentation to release the upgrade to the field.
The OFP CTF, Eglin AFB, led the F-16 flight test team in support of the M7.2+ program and was credited with more than 4,200 sorties and 4,600 flight hours, including participation in the 2019 Northern Edge Exercise. The OFP CTF is unique in that it is the only dual MAJCOM (ACC and AFMC) unit in the USAF that specializes in fully integrating Developmental and Operational Test under one commander. This construct enables end-to-end ownership and effective integration of the weapon system through design, development, and ultimately the fielding recommendation provided to the USAF.
The fielding of the M7.2+ OFP to over 600 USAF F-16s marks a milestone in the future of flight test efficiency,” said Lt. Col. Ben "Rex” Wysack, Director of the F-16 Test Division, OFP CTF. This was the first F-16 OFP ever managed from beginning to end, entirely under the capable hands of the fine men and women of the OFP CTF. Thanks to the incredible support and hard work from the Integrated Product Team at Hill, Edwards, Nellis, and Wright Patterson Air Force Bases, the warfighter has a much more capable F-16 than before.”
OFP M7.2+ is also the official sunset of a legacy software development approach known as waterfall.” Moving forward, F-16 OFP development will use an open source, agile approach called DevSecOps as part of a Department of Defense initiative to revolutionize software development. DevSecOps is a software engineering culture and practice that aims at unifying software development (Dev), with “baked-in” cybersecurity (Sec), and software operation (Ops). The advantages DevSecOps provides over waterfall are shorter development cycles, increased deployment frequency through continuous delivery, and more dependable releases through continuous integration, all in closer alignment with military objectives, Marsh said. “In terms of release cadence we’ll be delivering new software to flight test every 13 weeks versus 18 and new OFPs to the warfighter every two years versus every 3-4 years,” remarked Lt Col Paul Tinker, Materiel Leader for F-16 USAF Development. The 309th is making huge strides in their software transformation efforts and leading our developmental enterprise towards the release on demand capability required for a modern Air Force.”
The F-16 SPO and 309th SWEG are already hard at work laying the groundwork for successful DevSecOps implementation. “The 309th is excited about the future of the F-16,” said David Droge, the 309th F-16 Technical Project Manager. The changes to the Requirements Development Process allows the 309th Software teams to be more responsive to the user needs and pivot when needed to accommodate updated demands in an ever-changing threat environment. We look forward to providing continued support and to be in lock-step with our users to keep the F-16 relevant for decades to come.”
In 2019, Dr. Will Roper, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, challenged the F-16 team to install and run Kubernetes, a key open-source platform for managing containerized workloads and services in DevSecOps, on an F-16 in 45 days. The 309th successfully conducted a proof-of-concept demonstration in front of Dr. Roper and Nicolas M. Chaillan, Air Force Chief Software Officer, in December 2019 and is already exploring the next level of integration, Marsh said. The end goal is for future F-16 software updates to be released on-demand and received in-flight without having to land, reducing software fielding timelines by 50 percent.
After many test sorties, weapons checks, and all that goes into getting fighter aircraft software right, last week we officially requested approval to field a major upgrade to the post-block F-16 fleet,” said Col. Timothy Bailey, F-16 System Program Manager and Senior Materiel Leader. From government coders to flight test pilots, I’m grateful for the M7.2 team’s hard work. This will be the fleet’s FINAL waterfall software program. Agile or bust!”
Needless to say, the future of the Viper is as exciting as ever. The F-16 continues to push boundaries and change what it means to be a modern fighter, now through software development and deployment.
Boasting about delivering upgrades every 2 years for half a billion dollars with a team of 300 and “working hard” for such standard industry practices as agile DevSecOps using Kubernetes is redolant of Russian efforts.
Modular Open Systems Architecture has been mandated for US military systems since 2017.
The 2021 DoD Enterpise DevSecOps Strategy Guide links to a series of reasonably clear directives on exactly how to do it.
That covers a bottom level for rolling out software. Training is available from open source companies like Red Hat.
At the top level, Architecture a complete Architectural system has been established by an Object Management Group Consortium called FACE for “Future Airborne Computing Environment”.
The Face Overview 2.0 explains the large library of documentation. Registration to login and download anything just requires a working email address and they don’t spam. So please do download the overview if you want to understand what I hope to be writing about soon.
Basically my view is that this stuff means they should be able to use modules already developed for other systems to rapidly rollout both initial fielded capability of drones using Jetson Orin and updates to them. That’s essentially what they are for.
It should be in use for pretty well everything that gets delayed for software updates. Understanding why it isn’t could be important so my next post on this will be explaining why and how I am looking for help to deal with that, which requires preliminary reading and understanding of above 3 links.
PS I also read Mick Ryan on Human-Machine Teaming for Future Ground Forces as recommended by @Bishop
That was also interesting but basically skipped over concrete analysis of use of drones in Ukraine war from 2014 to pontificate about the more distant future without shedding any light on what is available and needed now and what can actually be done to deliver at the “speed of relevance”.
3 Likes
This is a new definition of “organic” for me.
“It was the vibe, man…”
2 Likes
1 Like
I still don’t know how you force a country with 4000 nukes to accept any sort of DMZ. I remain hopeful and optimistic but also very wary, there’s lots of escalation steps that Russia has between now and the end of this war that Ukr can’t go with
3 Likes
We have good historical references for how military industry affects the economy. It is not wuite zero sum or negative but it is not a direct effect either, maybe second or third order effect.
The resources and most of the tooling are lost (so to speak) but the technical knowledge and skills are adaptable to other endeavours. The cost was absorbed by the different gov after wwii, but the skilled labour and the supply chain efficiencies gained during the war helped the post war economic development.
For wwi there were many othe factors that affected the ability to capitalize on this; like the spanish flu and less flexibility for the tech of the day.
2 Likes
And including laying off the workers who had gained the technical skills in the manufacturing industries during the First World War, and happened to include a large female component, so that the menfolk who had been at the front lines (and definitely needed the job opportunities) could take the positions - but lost the skilled up workforce in the process.
3 Likes
Sorry, it was just a tweet.
1 Like