This HPM counter UAS increases the urgency of stopping supplies of Jetson Orin reaching Russia via China etc.
As mentioned in the tweet thread:
I don’t think that’s correct for HPM (it may be correct for laser).
Correct me if I am wrong, but my understanding is that the part of the electronics that cannot be protected from HPM is precisely the RF receivers that have to be connected to an aerial that will be hit with High Powered Microwave.
This is easy to do for HPM tuned to the same frequency as the GNSS Satnav receivers.
Presumably Epirus Leonidas is able to also do the harder job of damaging the RF front end of frequency hopping C2.
My understanding is that it would not be particularly difficult to shield the rest of the electronics from HPM.
Such shielding would not enable a drone that cannot communicate or orientate to complete its mission or even return to base.
But anything sophisticated enough to carry an image processor capable of navigating by registration of camera images against stored maps would also have had to be expensive enough to justify a missile attack.
I don’t think that remains true given SWaP-C of Jetson Orin.
Those Iranian drones would certainly be fitted with precision navigation that survives an HPM attack when Russia or Iran get a supply of Jetson Orin.
So they would become useful against military point targets, not just infrastructure and expensive missile defence would still be needed.
On the other hand, it would not be easy for Russia to get adequate supplies of short range HPM systems like Epirus Leonidas quickly, so Ukrainian drones with Jetson Orin would become much less vulnerable to EW than at present.
The only details I have are the datasheets at:
via registration page demanding an email address to spam but not verifying it before allowing download.
As far as I can tell the big advantage of Leonidas is lower SWaP.
I didn’t see any indication that it can target more complex waveforms than those used for military C2 of cheap drones (as opposed to civilian drones using ordinary WiFi). My understanding is that the high attrition rate of modified cheap drones in Ukraine includes Russian EW capabilities that can attack at least their GNSS by jamming and there would be no technology obstacles to also attacking the simple waveforms in the same way as Leonidas - the equipment would just be bigger and need more power.
Beautiful Ukrainian Army - Награш band
